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THE MEANING OF "LIFE": BELIEF AND
REASON IN THE ABORTION DEBATE
CAITLIN E. BORGMANN*
In 1993, a man named Michael Griffin killed David Gunn, a fortyseven-year-old doctor who provided abortions at a clinic in Pensacola,
Florida. Before shooting Gunn three times in the back, Griffin yelled,
"Don't kill any more babies!"' According to news reports, protestors
present at the clinic that day, members of a "militant" anti-abortion-rights
group, were elated, shouting, "Praise God! Praise God! One of the babykillers is dead.",2 Yet "mainstream" anti-abortion-rights groups, who are
were
more representative of the majority of abortion-rights opponents,
3 sensing "a public-relations disaster."4
murder,
the
renounce
to
quick
In August 2008, then-presidential nominees Senators Barack
Obama and John McCain appeared separately at a religious forum hosted
by best-selling author and evangelical pastor, Rick Warren. Warren asked

* Professor of Law, CUNY School of Law; B.A., Yale University; J.D., New York
University School of Law. I am grateful for the helpful comments of Albert Borgmann, Jeff
Kirchmeier, Margaret Little, John D. Lovi, Thomas Nagel, and participants in a faculty

forum at CUNY Law School.
1 William Booth, Doctor Killed During Abortion Protest, WASH. POST, Mar. 11,
1993, at AI; Eloise Salholz & Peter Katel, The Death Of Doctor Gunn, NEWSWEEK, Mar. 22,
1993, at 34.
2 Salholz

& Katel, supra note 1, at 34.

3 Id.Since Gunn's murder, several other abortion providers have been killed by

anti-abortion-rights protesters. In the most recent incident, Dr. George Tiller was gunned
down in the foyer of his church in Wichita, Kansas. Joe Stumpe & Monica Davey, Abortion
Doctor Shot to Death in Kansas Church, N.Y. TIMES, May 31, 2009, at AI. Following his
death, Tiller's clinic was shut down permanently. Monica Davey, Kansas Abortion Clinic
Operatedby Doctor Who Was Killed Closes Permanently,N.Y. TIMES, June 9, 2009, at A 16.
4 Steve Goldstein, Killer at Abortion Clinic Believes His Act Was Right, PHIL.
INQUIRER,

May 6, 1999, at A29.
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each candidate at what point "a baby [is] entitled to human rights.",5 McCain
responded simply, "At conception." This position appears consistent with
Griffin's view that abortion amounts to killing babies, and at odds with
McCain's own support for stem cell research and for abortion under limited
circumstances. 6 Yet, far from challenging McCain, Warren seemed satisfied
that McCain's answer encapsulated a complete and coherent moral position
on abortion. Suggesting that no further examination was warranted, he
remarked, "Okay. We don't have to go longer on that one." 7 For his part,
Obama answered that "if you believe that life begins at conception, then- 8
and you are consistent in that belief-then I can't argue with you on that.",
Obama's response mirrored the standard liberal position, which divorces the
moral question of "life"-what it means and when it begins-from the legal
questions of abortion and personhood. 9
It is ironic that in the abortion debate, one of the most pressing
moral controversies of our time, 10 we condemn apparent moral consistency
5 Pastor Rick and Kay Warren Broadcast Transcript Service: Saddleback Civil
Forum on the Presidency (Aug. 16, 2008) (transcript on file with the author).
6 McCain supports rape and incest exceptions for abortion. See Onthelssues.org,
John McCain on Abortion, http://www.ontheissues.org/Social/JohnMcCainAbortion.htm
(last visited Oct. 1, 2009); see also infra Part II.A.
7 Saddleback Civil Forum, supra note 5.
8

1d.

9 See infra Part 1I.B & C. This Article assumes that a "liberal" claims that "the
collective power of the state [should not be used] to impose a highly personal or religious
value on those who do not accept it." Thomas Nagel, Letter to the Editor, The Case for
Liberalism: An Exchange, THE N.Y. REV. OF BOOKS, Oct. 5, 2006, at 56-57 (an exchange
between Thomas Nagel and Michael Sandel); see also Michael Sandel, id. at 56 (continuing
the aforementioned exchange). It further assumes that a "liberal" position on abortion holds
that a woman has a constitutional right to end her pregnancy, while a "conservative" position
claims that a woman has no such right and that the state may prevent women from obtaining
abortions in order to further the state's own interest in the life of the embryo or fetus. In this
Article, the term "person" refers to a rights-holding person in the constitutional sense. The
somewhat cumbersome phrase "embryo or fetus" is used throughout the Article to highlight
the often overlooked fact that the embryo does not become a fetus until approximately eight
weeks after fertilization, or ten weeks of pregnancy following the convention of dating
pregnancy from the beginning of the last menstrual period. The vast majority of abortions,
therefore, are of embryos, not fetuses. See Guttmacher Institute, Facts on Induced Abortion
in the United States, http://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/fb inducedabortion.html (last visited
Oct. 1, 2009) (noting approximately eighty percent of all abortions occur within the first ten
weeks of pregnancy).
10 See, e.g.,

RONALD

DwoRKIN,

LIFE'S
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ABORTION, EUTHANASIA, AND INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM 4 (Vintage 1994); see also J. Harvie
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and conviction and defer to moral incoherence and superficiality. We revile
and dismiss as a fanatic the man who thinks abortion is murder and who
acts upon his belief, saving thousands of "innocent children" from
imminent death by attacking their would-be killer. Yet, we acknowledge
respectfully as "mainstream" one who professes the identical belief, but for
whom the claim is seemingly nothing but hollow rhetoric. If abortion
opponents in 1993 believed that abortion was murder, why did they
denounce Griffin?" If, as Flip Benham, leader of the anti-abortion-rights
group Operation Rescue, declared after the slaying of another doctor, the
doctor had "murdered countless thousands of innocent children" and would
have continued to do so, why was Benham "sad to learn of his death,"' 12 and
why did he describe the murders of abortion doctors as acts of "cowardice,
terror and murder?"' 13 Would he have been equally sad to learn of the death
of Adolf Hitler? Would he label an assassin of Osama bin Laden a coward
or a murderer? "Mainstream" opposition to abortion clearly is more
complex than the rhetoric indicates. Given this, why do liberals like Obama
feel they cannot question the belief that human rights vest upon conception?
As Warren's forum demonstrates, the declaration that "life begins
at conception" has become a conversation-stopper that has stymied the
national debate over abortion. 14 We have grown accustomed to thinking of
the abortion debate as a furious and irreconcilable conflict. The abortion
controversy is commonly called a war. 15 This is not surprising when one
considers the absolute nature of anti-abortion rhetoric: Abortion is murder.
Wilkinson Ill, Of Guns, Abortions, and the UnravelingRule of Law, 95 VA. L. REV. 253, 256
(2009) (describing Roe v. Wade as "by any measure" one of the "most important decisions of
the modern judicial era").
11See Matt Trewhella, Abortion and Punishment, THE COVENANT NEWS, Oct. 24,
2007, http://www.covenantnews.com/trewhella071024.htm ("[M]ost Christians... have not
come to grips with the humanity of the preborn child; they view the child as less than human.
This is also why every time someone uses force to protect the preborn, Christians cannot get
to their fax machines quick enough to be the first to condemn such actions.").
12 Murder of New

York Abortion Doctor Denounced as "Terrorism, " CNN.COM,

Oct. 24, 1998, http://www.cnn.com/US/9810/24/doctor.killed.02/.
13See Goldstein, supra note 4, at A29.
14
KNOWLEDGE

See also Richard Rorty, Religion as Conversation-Stopper, 3

COMMON

1-6 (1994).

'5 See, e.g., JAMES RISEN & JUDY L. THOMAS, WRATH OF ANGELS: THE AMERICAN
ABORTION WAR (1999); ABORTION WARS: A HALF CENTURY OF STRUGGLE, 1950-2000

(Rickie Solinger ed., 1998).
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Abortion kills innocent babies. Abortion is like the Holocaust. 16 Abortion
often appears to inspire more passion than actual instances of war or
genocide. If we take conservative rhetoric on abortion at face value, the
abortion issue seems hopeless and intractable.17 The Supreme Court has
thrown up its hands and excused itself from this conversation, even as it has
upheld the constitutional right to abortion. In Roe v. Wade, the Court
declared, "We need not resolve the difficult question of when life begins." 18
Any moral position on abortion, if society is to accept it, must
appeal to both belief and reason.1 9 Moral judgments need beliefs for
substantial content. But they gain validity only when they are supported by
reason. This conjunction of belief and reason is known as "reflective
equilibrium." 20 Moreover, if they are to bind a pluralistic society, beliefs
about abortion must be articulated in a way that satisfies public reason."
This Article argues that both conservatives and liberals have failed to meet
these requirements in the abortion debate. In invoking claims of embryonic
personhood, conservatives have eschewed demonstrating the coherence
16

Pope Likens Abortion to Holocaust, BBC

NEWS,

Feb.

22,

2005,

http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/4288103.stm.
17See

Erwin Chemerinsky, Rationalizing the Abortion Debate: Legal Rhetoric and

the Abortion Controversy, 31 BUFF. L. REv. 107, 109 (1982) ("The abortion debate has
become an area of impasse, not argument.").
18Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 159 (1973).
19"Reason" is used here in the instrumental sense, i.e., as a means of checking
clarity and consistency. Substantive reason may also play a part in the abortion debate. But
nearly everyone can agree that, at minimum, the debate over abortion will be advanced by an
insistence on instrumental reason.
20

See JOHN

RAWLS,

A THEORY OF JUSTICE 48 (Belknap Press 1971) ("[T]he best

account of a person's sense of justice is not the one which fits his judgments prior to his
examining any conception of justice, but rather the one which matches his judgments in
reflective equilibrium."). Rawls's notion of reflective equilibrium is one of two
methodologies in A Theory of Justice (the other being the "original position"). These two are
succeeded by still others, including the "overlapping consensus."
21 See JOHN RAWLS, JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS: A RESTATEMENT 92 (Erin Kelly ed.,
Belknap Press 2001) (arguing that public reason reflects "our willingness to settle the
fundamental political matters in ways that others as free and equal can acknowledge are
reasonable and rational"); Jirgen Habermas, Speech upon Accepting Peace Prize of German
Publishers & Booksellers Assn. (Oct. 14, 2001) (discussing religion and public life and the
need to "search for reasons that aspire to general acceptance"); see also CHRISTOPHER J.
EBERLE,

RELIGIOUS

justification").

CONVICTION

IN LIBERAL

POLITICS

(2002)

(discussing

"public
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among their beliefs about fetal personhood and their other considered
judgments. But conservatives' positions on abortion are inconsistent with a
moral view that recognizes embryos and fetuses as full, legal persons.
Conservatives have been conscious of the need to appeal to public reason
rather than relying on peculiarly religious justifications. But these efforts
have been deceptive and disingenuous. Conservatives often invoke the
universal value of "human life" in opposing abortion. But they can commit
only to a "thin" conception of life (that an embryo or fetus is a human
organism in the process of developing into a person), even as they trade on
the more compelling "thick" notions that the word "life" invokes.22 The
unsurprising fact that an embryo or fetus is, biologically, "human life"
simply does not answer the moral (or legal) question whether and when that
"life" is to be accorded some or all of the rights of a person.23
On the other hand, liberals, who tend to distrust beliefs as a basis
for moral theory, prefer to dodge conservatives' beliefs in the abortion
debate. Rather than directly challenging claims of embryonic or fetal
personhood as unreasonable, liberals often profess respect for these
beliefs. 24 Some liberals have argued that abortion should be allowed even if
conservatives are right that the embryo or fetus is a person.25 However, this
Article claims, these arguments fail to respond effectively to claims of
embryonic or fetal personhood.26
More importantly, they are fallback arguments to liberals' real
position on abortion. Liberals, of course, do not in fact believe that the law
should recognize the embryo or fetus as a person. Instead, they assume that
22 See infra text accompanying notes 189-201.
23

Conservatives have sometimes attempted to appeal to public reason and avoid

framing their positions in explicitly religious terms by alleging improbably that their
references to "human life" are merely biological in nature. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood v.
Rounds, 530 F.3d 724, 728 (8th Cir. 2008) (accepting this argument in the context of an
"informed consent" abortion law); Letter from Samuel B. Casey & Harold J. Cassidy (Law
Life Project, Christian Legal Society) to Members of the South Dakota Pro-Life Leadership
Coalition (Oct. 10, 2007) (on file with the author) (arguing same). For analysis of this trend,
see Robert Post, Informed Consent to Abortion: A First Amendment Analysis of Compelled
Physician Speech, 2007 U. ILL. L. REv. 939, 954 (discussing a South Dakota "informed
consent" law), and Caitlin E. Borgmann, Judicial Evasion and Disingenuous Legislative
Appeals to Science in the Abortion Controversy, 17 J.L. & POL'Y 101, 123-28 (2009)
[hereinafter Borgmann, JudicialEvasion] (discussing PlannedParenthoodv. Rounds).
24

See infra Part I.B.

25 See id
26

See id.
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society, or the Supreme Court, can determine that women's liberty demands
the right to choose abortion, while leaving the moral question of abortion
and personhood unanswered and thus open for each individual to decide.27
Michael Sandel calls this "bracketing" the question of fetal personhood.28
But, this Article argues, neither the Supreme Court nor the public can
successfully "bracket" the question of when personhood begins.2 9 As a
moral question, personhood is too important to leave to individual choice.
And the constitutional question of personhood goes hand in hand with the
moral question.3 ° If, as a moral matter, an embryo or fetus is a person, then
ultimately this must be reflected in the interpretation of our Constitution
just as, for example, the moral recognition that slaves were persons led
3
ineluctably to their recognition as full persons under the Constitution. 1
By purporting to leave the question for each individual to decide,
the Court has not dodged the question but rather has effectively rejected a
belief in fetal personhood, for if an embryo or fetus is a person, abortions
must be prohibited, and women who obtain abortions are as culpable as the
doctors who perform them.32 Indeed, the positions of even the Court's most
conservative members implicitly disavow that a fetus is a person.33
Moreover, by avoiding the question of embryonic and fetal personhood,
liberals have neglected the important role women's autonomy and dignity
should play in the debate, leading to a perception of abortion as a morally
bankrupt choice.34
This Article argues that, rather than avoiding the most critical moral
question in the abortion debate, conservatives and liberals must engage in a
public conversation about abortion that seeks reflective equilibrium on the
27 See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
Michael J. Sandel, Moral Argument and Liberal Toleration: Abortion and
Homosexuality, 77 CAL. L. REV. 521, 521 (1989) [hereinafter Sandel, Moral Argument].
Sandel argues that the question cannot be bracketed. See id.; see also infra Part I.C.
28

29

See infra Parts I.C., II.A.

30 See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Core of an Uneasy Casefor JudicialReview, 121
HARV. L. REV. 1693, 1696-98 (2008) (assuming that "debates about constitutional rights at
bottom are or ought to be debates about moral rights").
31See infra Part I.C.
32

See id.

33 See infra Part II.A.
34 See infra Parts IC, I11.
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status of the embryo or fetus, one that satisfies the demands of public
reason. This conversation would be a very different, and more fruitful,
public debate: one that would seek to understand the real reasons why
conservatives oppose some abortions and not others, for example, and to
see whether these newly surfaced reasons might yield some common moral
ground on the issue. 35 In such a conversation, liberal and conservative
positions on abortion would likely converge on a gradualist view of the
embryo's moral status (that an embryo has moral significance that grows as
the embryo, and later fetus, matures).3 6 This Article argues that such a view
of the fetus neither relieves the Court of its obligation to protect women's
rights nor sanctions onerous state regulation of abortion.37 The primary aim
of this Article, however, is not to answer definitively the questions of the
value of fetal life and of morally defensible abortion regulation. Rather, it is
to argue for the importance of a discussion that assesses the consistency and
coherence of asserted moral positions on abortion and that demands that
these positions be supported by public reason. In particular, the Article
exposes and examines how the abortion debate has become polarized and
intractable because of both sides' failure to satisfy this demand with respect
to the issue of personhood.
35Although it is beyond the scope of this Article to suggest what these reasons are,

other scholars have addressed this question. Reva Siegel, for example, has done extensive
research on the antiabortion movement and posits that "antiabortion advocates now assert
that women seeking abortions are vulnerable, dependent, and confused, and need restrictions
on abortion to protect them from coercion and their own mistaken decisionmaking and to

free them to fulfill their natures as mothers." Reva B. Siegel, Dignity and the Politics of
Protection: Abortion Restrictions Under Casey/Carhart, 117 YALE L.J. 1694, 1773 (2008)
(internal citations omitted) [hereinafter Siegel, Dignity]; see also Reva B. Siegel, The New
Politics of Abortion: An Equality Analysis of Woman-ProtectiveAbortion Restrictions, 2007
U. ILL. L. REV. 991, 993 [hereinafter Siegel, New Politics] ("analyz[ing] the state's claimed
interest in protecting women from abortion and show[ing] that these justifications rest on
gender stereotypes about women's capacity and women's roles"); see also GEORGE LAKOFF,
DON'T THINK OF AN ELEPHANT 85, 101 (2004) (arguing that "[c]onservatives . . . are not
really pro-life in any broad sense" and that abortion is a "stand-in" for "general strict father
values" and "control of women's lives"). Michael McConnell suggests that "the pro-life
movement sees itself as devoted to the woman's interests as well as the child's" and also that
it seeks to protect women from men who prefer "to engage in sex without risking any
consequences." Michael W. McConnell, How Not To Promote Serious DeliberationAbout
Abortion, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 1181, 1191-92 (1991); see also Martin Rhonheimer, A
ConstitutionalistApproach to the Encyclical Evangelium Vitae, 43 AM. J. JURIS. 135, 142-43
(1998) (abortion laws may be premised upon protecting women from predatory men).
36

See infra Part III.

37See id.
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This Article proceeds in three parts. Part I addresses the concept of
the embryo or fetus as a person. It examines the apparent trend in many
areas of the law to recognize embryonic or fetal personhood. It then
considers defenses of the right to abortion that assume embryonic or fetal
personhood and argues that these defenses are ultimately unpersuasive. Part
I next examines the standard liberal approach to abortion regulationwhich asserts that the question of fetal personhood should be left to
individuals to decide-and counters that any decision about the legality or
illegality of abortion demands that the question of embryonic or fetal
personhood be answered.
Part II takes up that question, focusing on how conservatives'
ambiguous rhetoric helps to obscure their actual position on abortion. Part II
first examines claims of fetal personhood and concludes that exceedingly
few people hold positions that consistently treat a fetus, let alone an
embryo, as a person. It then examines the rhetoric of "life" and
"motherhood" commonly used in the abortion debate and argues that the
use of these terms is misleading, suggesting a belief in embryonic or fetal
personhood that the speaker does not consistently hold. Part II describes
"thick" and "thin" versions of these terms and concludes that conservatives
commit only to thin versions of "life" and "motherhood" while capitalizing
on the emotions and moral judgments that the thick versions invoke for
most people.
Part III considers how we might view the abortion decision as a
moral issue once the murky rhetoric is clarified and the apparently
overriding question of embryonic and fetal personhood is laid aside.
I. LIBERAL RESPONSES TO CLAIMS OF EMBRYONIC AND
FETAL PERSONHOOD
A. Embryonic and Fetal Personhood in the Law
The conservative portrayal of fetuses as persons pervades public
discourse about abortion. Conservatives typically refer to a fetus or even an
embryo as the "unborn child," suggesting that the fetus or embryo is
equivalent to a baby or child and is distinguished solely by the
happenstance of its physical or temporal location. Consistent with this
rhetoric, conservatives have attempted, often successfully, to have the
embryo or fetus treated as a legal person in many contexts outside abortion.
Fetuses have been made crime victims in their own right under laws
punishing fetal homicide.3 s Some states allow civil suits to be brought on
38 See, e.g., Unborn Victims of Violence Act of 2004, 18

U.S.C. § 1841 (2009).
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behalf of fetuses for wrongful death. 39 Federal Department of Health and
Human Services regulations define children eligible for health insurance
under the federal State Children's Health Insurance Program as "an
individual under the age of 19 including the period from conception to
birth.'A'° Wisconsin allows the state to incarcerate pregnant women during
pregnancy in order to prevent harm to the fetus. 41 Some state statutes and
proposed state constitutional amendments would define legal personhood as
beginning upon conception.42 Within the abortion context, trial court judges
have sometimes appointed a guardian ad litem to represent the embryo or
fetus in judicial proceedings in which minors seek court permission for a
confidential abortion.43 States have passed laws that require abortion
providers to anesthetize the fetus before an abortion if the woman
consents.44 Doctors who provide abortions have been sued for malpractice
for failing to tell the woman that her embryo is "a complete, separate, and
unique human
being" and that she would be "responsible for killing her
45
own child.

39 See Dena M. Marks, Person v. Potential: Judicial Struggles to Decide Claims
Arising from the Death of an Embryo or Fetus and Michigan's Struggle to Settle the
Question, 37 AKRON L. REV. 41, 43-45 (2004) (reviewing state causes of action for wrongful

death of in utero embryos or fetuses).
40 42 C.F.R. § 457.10 (2007) (emphasis added).
41WIs. STAT. § 48.01 (2009).
42 See, e.g., Mo. REV. STAT. §§ 1.205.1(1), (2) (2009) (requiring that all Missouri
laws be interpreted to provide unborn children with the same rights enjoyed by other
persons); H.R. 3284, 117th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (S.C. 2007) (bill establishing that due
process and equal protection rights "vest at fertilization"); see also Colorado for Equal
Rights, November 2008 Ballot Initiative, http://www.coloradoforequalrights.com/files/
initiativetext.pdf (last visited Oct. 1, 2009) (discussing proposed constitutional amendment
extending "inalienable rights, equality of justice, and due process of law" to "any human
being from the moment of fertilization"). The Supreme Court has interpreted the Missouri
provision to have no legal effect upon the availability of abortion in Missouri. See Webster v.
Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 505-06 (1989).

43 See generally Helena Silverstein, In the Matter of Anonymous, a Minor: Fetal
Representation in Hearings to Waive Parental Consent for Abortion, 11 CORNELL J.L. &
PUB. POL'Y 69 (2001).
44 See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-16-1104 (2009).
45 See, e.g., Acuna v. Turkish, 192 N.J. 399, 407 (2007); Tina Kelley, Trenton:
Abortion MalpracticeAppeal, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 26, 2007, at B8. South Dakota now has a
statute that requires that abortion providers give patients a written statement making similar
assertions. See S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 34-23A-10.1 (l)(e)(i), (ii) (2009).
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No existing legal recognition of the embryo or fetus renders it a
constitutional person; any such recognition would conflict with the
constitutional right to abortion. Rather, the laws treat the embryo or fetus as
a separate, rights-holding entity in a particular context. Drafters of such
legislation often actively resist rewriting these laws in ways that would
avoid treating the embryo or fetus as a distinct entity from the woman
carrying it. For example, they have rejected proposals to substitute fetal
homicide legislation with "harm to pregnant women" statutes.46 The
transparent goal is to undermine support for abortion by making the fetus a
person in so many other legal settings that abortion comes to be viewed as a
morally unacceptable exception to a general principle.47
These types of legislative measures and litigation strategies are
proliferating. Some considered an abortion ban enacted in South Dakota in
2006, which contained only a limited exception for abortions necessary to
prevent the woman's death,48 to demonstrate vividly an irrevocable slide
toward a public consensus that the embryo or fetus is a person.49 South
Dakota is not the only state to introduce a near-total abortion ban in recent
years. Several states have enacted contingent bans that are intended to take

46 See generally Sandra L. Smith, Note, Fetal Homicide: Woman or Fetus as
Victim? A Survey of Current State Approaches and Recommendations for Future State
Application, 41 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1845 (2000).
47 See Memorandum from James Bopp, Jr. & Richard E. Coleson, Attorneys at
Law, Bopp, Coleson & Bostrom, To Whom It May Concern, at 6, 8 (Aug. 7, 2007),
available at http://personhood.net/docs/BoppMemoranduml.pdf
(addressing "pro-life

strategy issues" and describing a "statute including unborn victims in homicide laws" as one
of many "helpful legal changes" to "keep the abortion issue alive and ... translate into more
disfavor for all abortions"); Casey & Cassidy, supra note 22, at 3, 13, 15 (discussing need
for "incremental approach" to outlawing abortion, fighting on "favorable terrain" in order to
change "hearts and minds").
48 The abortion ban was ultimately defeated by voters. See Monica Davey, South
Dakotans Reject Sweeping Abortion Ban, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 8, 2006, at P8. South Dakota
voters rejected a similar ban, which included limited exceptions for rape and the woman's
health, in 2008. See Tiffany Sharpies, Ballot Initiatives: No to Gay Marriage,Anti-Abortion
Measures,
TIME,
Nov.
5,
2008,
available
at
http://www.time.com/time/politics/article/0,8599,1856820,00.html.

49 See, e.g., Eileen McDonagh, The Next Step After Roe: Using Fundamental
Rights, Equal ProtectionAnalysis to Nullify Restrictive State-Level Abortion Legislation, 56
EMORY L.J. 1173 (2007).
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effect if the Court should overturn Roe v. Wade and would allow abortion
only to prevent the woman's death.5 °
Some commentators have identified a recent shift in the rhetoric of
the anti-abortion-rights movement away from fetal personhood and toward
the woman. 51 This shift has gained strength in the wake of the Supreme
Court's decision upholding the federal Partial Birth Abortion Ban Act in
Gonzales v. Carhart (Carhart 11).52 Under this approach, the movement
characterizes abortion as harmful to the mental and/or physical health of the
pregnant woman. Women are portrayed as "mothers" from the very
inception of even unwanted or untenable pregnancies, and abortion is seen
as slashing the bonds of motherhood. Viewed in this light, abortion
restrictions are transformed into measures that promote women's health and
well-being and that protect women from the exploitation and deception of
abortion providers.53
This approach is epitomized by another South Dakota law recently
upheld by the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals.54 The law requires doctors
to inform women seeking abortions that the procedure may cause
"[d]epression and related psychological distress" and "[i]ncreased risk of
suicide ideation and suicide. 5 5 Justice Kennedy, in CarhartII, echoed this
rhetoric when he suggested that abortion harms women. For example, he
wrote:
Whether to have an abortion requires a difficult and painful moral
decision. While we find no reliable data to measure the
phenomenon, it seems unexceptionable to conclude some women
Louisiana, Mississippi, and South Dakota have passed such contingent bans.
North Dakota has passed a similar ban that would allow a doctor to claim rape, incest, or risk
of death as an affirmative defense. GUTTMACHER INSTITUTE, STATE POLICIES IN BRIEF:
50

ABORTION

POLICY

IN

THE

ABSENCE

OF

ROE

(2009),

available

at

http://www.guttmacher.org/statecenter/spibs/spibAPAR.pdf.
51See, e.g., Reva B. Siegel, The Right's Reasons: ConstitutionalConflict and the
Spread of Woman-ProtectiveAntiabortion Argument, 57 DUKE L.J. 1641 (2008) [hereinafter,
Seigel, The Right's Reasons].
52 550 U.S. 124 (2007). In Stenberg v. Carhart(Carhart 1), the Supreme Court

invalidated a nearly identical Nebraska ban. 530 U.S. 914 (2000).
53See generally Siegel, The Right's Reasons, supra note 51.
54Planned Parenthood Minn. v. Rounds, 530 F.3d 724, 734 (8th Cir. 2008) (en

banc); see also Borgmann, JudicialEvasion, supra note 23, at 123-26 (discussing Rounds).
55S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 34-23A- 10.1 (1)(e)(i)--(ii) (2009).

Columbia Journalof Gender and Law

[Vol. 18:2

come to regret their choice to abort the infant life they once
created and sustained. Severe depression and loss of esteem can
follow.

56

The question whether to shift attention from the fetus toward
abortion's impact on women has been the source of a long-festering rift in
the anti-abortion-rights movement. However, the two approaches, while
differing in emphasis, are of a piece. Pregnant women seeking abortions are
portrayed as mothers because the embryo or fetus is portrayed as already a
person. Women have a "constitutionally protected relationship" (as the
South Dakota law puts it) with the embryo or fetus because it is already a
child. Women will have post-traumatic stress syndrome, it is claimed,57
because of their regret over the abortion (again, because the woman ended
58
her child's life).

Despite the apparent progress toward embryonic and fetal rights in
a number of legal contexts, the Supreme Court has yet to reverse its
essential holding in Roe v. Wade that women have a constitutional right to
abortion. Each time it has reaffirmed this holding, 59 the Court has implicitly
rejected claims of fetal personhood. 60 Even in CarhartII, where the Court
56 Carhart11, 550 U.S. at 158-59 (2007). Two anti-abortion-rights lawyers who
were architects of the South Dakota strategy wrote that the South Dakota law and its defense
in federal court have "been litigated with an eye towards Justice Kennedy in particular," and
that "[i]t
was not a coincidence that Justice Kennedy cited to [an amicus brief] which related
the experiences of post abortive women." Casey & Cassidy, supra note 23, at 10, 12.
57As Justice Kennedy admitted, no credible evidence for this claim exists. See,
e.g., Carhart 11, 550 U.S. at 183-84 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); Post, supra note 23; REPORT
OF THE APA TASK FORCE ON MENTAL HEALTH AND ABORTION 5-6 (2008), available at

www.apa.org/releases/abortion-report.pdf.
58 Significantly, these arguments are generally not focused on abortion as
physically dangerous for women, an argument opponents can no longer plausibly make now
that the procedure has become so safe. See Henshaw SK, Unintended Pregnancy and
Abortion: A Public Health Perspective, in A CLINICIAN'S GUIDE TO MEDICAL AND SURGICAL
ABORTION 11-22 (Maureen Paul et al. eds., 1999) (Fewer than one percent of all U.S.

abortion patients experience a major complication. The risk of death associated with abortion
in the United States is less than 0.6 per 100,000 procedures, less than one-tenth as large as
the risk associated with childbirth). Nevertheless, claims that abortion is physically harmful
to women persist, especially the claim that abortion causes breast cancer. See, e.g., REPORT
OF

THE

SOUTH

DAKOTA

TASK

FORCE

TO

STUDY

ABORTION

(2005),

available at

http://www.voteyesforlife.com/docs/TaskForceReport.pdf.
59See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992); Stenberg
v. Carhart (Carhart 1), 530 U.S. 914 (2000).
6
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refused to reaffirm Roe's validity, 61 the Court implicitly denied the embryo
or fetus's constitutional personhood by failing to overturn Roe and to grant
constitutional rights to the fetus. 62 So although the Court has formally

declined to answer the question of fetal personhood, it has made it
impossible for states to protect fetuses as full persons outside of these
discrete contexts. Moreover, until the Court is ready both to overrule Roe v.
Wade and to declare fetuses to be persons under the Constitution, an
ultimate goal to outlaw abortion
unlikely scenario, conservatives'
63
nationwide will remain unmet.
B. Liberal Defenses of Abortion that Assume Embryonic or Fetal
Personhood
The widespread legal recognition of embryonic and fetal
personhood in specific contexts outside of abortion has led some pro-choice
scholars to hedge their bets by reviving arguments, prominently made by
Judith Jarvis Thomson in the early 1970s, 64 and adopted in various forms by
other scholars,65 that abortion should be permissible even if the fetus is a
person. 66 The arguments often compare abortion to self-defense. These
61 See Gonzales v. Carhart (CarhartI), 550 U.S. 124, 160-61 (2007) (referring to
"precedents we here assume to be controlling"); id. at 186-87 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting)
(criticizing majority for refusing to explicitly reaffirm Roe).

62 See text accompanying notes 91-94, infra, for discussion of Roe's implicit

conclusions about fetal personhood.
63

The scenario is unlikely because, even though several members of the Court

clearly stand ready to overrule Roe v. Wade, the ones who have made their views known
would return the issue to the states, not declare embryonic or fetal personhood under the
federal Constitution. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. at 979 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) ("The States may, if they wish, permit abortion on demand, but the Constitution
does not require them to do so. The permissibility of abortion, and the limitations upon it,
are to be resolved like most important questions in our democracy: by citizens trying to
persuade one another and then voting."). At most, the nation would see a patchwork of laws
similar to what existed before Roe.
64

Judith Jarvis Thomson, A Defense of Abortion, 1 PHIL. & PUB. AFF.47 (1971).

65

Nancy Davis refers to these commentators as the "Thomson-Moderates." Nancy

Davis, Abortion and Self-Defense, 13 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 175, 175-77 (1984) (reviewing the
arguments).
66 See, e.g., LAURENCE H. TRIBE, ABORTION: THE CLASH OF ABSOLUTES 129-30

(1990); McDonagh, supra note 49, at 1183 ("The power of Thomson's argument has always
been that even if the fetus is defined to be an unborn human being with the same rights as a
born human being, women still have a moral right to use deadly force to defend themselves
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claims, however, are unsatisfactory responses to assertions that a fetus is a
person. One problem is that none of the creative analogies designed to
portray abortion as self-defense are truly apt analogies to pregnancy and
thus fail to meet the requirements of public reason. The moral or emotional
reality of pregnancy for most women, and for the general public, is not
captured by comparing a pregnant woman's developing offspring to a fully
grown, famous violinist who somehow becomes attached to the woman
without her knowledge or consent, or to a giant baby squeezing the woman
out of a tiny house (to name two of Thomson's examples).67 As Richard
Posner puts it, "we can have no settled or reliable intuitions regarding the
[violinist] case, because the case is outside our empirical experience; it
belongs to science-fiction. So the analogy fails at the start.,, 68 A closer
analogy would at minimum acknowledge the biological tie of fetus to
woman and thus, for example, might pose that a woman's own baby were
hooked up to her kidneys or trapped in a house with her. Acknowledging
the tie, however, tends to weaken the power of the analogies. 69
Abortion also does not seem sufficiently analogous to more realistic
self-defense situations. For example, while it is permissible to use lethal
force to defend one's home, the law would not condone using such force
from nonconsensual intrusion upon their bodily integrity and liberty."); Robin West,
Concurringin the Judgment, in

WHAT ROE V. WADE SHOULD HAVE SAID: THE NATION'S TOP
LEGAL EXPERTS REWRITE AMERICA'S MOST CONTROVERSIAL DECISION 137-38 (Jack M.

Balkin ed., 2005) [hereinafter WHAT ROE

V. WADE SHOULD HAVE SAID]; see also AMY

GUTMANN & DENNIS THOMPSON, DEMOCRACY AND DISAGREEMENT: WHY MORAL CONFLICT
CANNOT BE AVOIDED IN POLITICS, AND WHAT SHOULD BE DONE ABOUT IT 85 (1996)

(Thomson's analogy "should convince even people who perceive the fetus to be a fullfledged person that to permit abortion is not obviously wrong in the case of a woman who
becomes pregnant through no fault of her own (for example, by rape)."); Eugene Volokh,
Medical Self-Defense, Prohibited Experimental Therapies, and Payment For Organs, 120

L. REV. 1813, 1825-26 (2007) ("Lethal self-defense and abortion-as-self-defense
share a moral core: the principle that people should generally be free to defend themselves
against that which is threatening their lives.").
67 See Thomson, supra note 64, at 4849, 52-53. In the violinist thought
experiment, Thomson asks the reader to imagine "wak[ing] up in the morning [to] find
yourself back to back in bed with ... [a] famous unconscious violinist," who has been
"plugged into" the reader's circulatory system in order to save the violinist from a fatal
kidney ailment. In nine months, the violinist will have recovered and could be disconnected.
See id. at 48-49.
HARV.

68 Richard

REV.

A. Posner, The Problematicsof Moral and Legal Theory, 111
1637, 1675 (1998).
69

See Davis, supra note 65, at 181, 184.

HARV.
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against an innocent baby that was deposited inside a person's front door, or
even against a baby that somehow happened to threaten one's health. The
analogies break down because in real-life self-defense situations, people are
defending themselves against an aggressor. Even if the aggressor is not
acting with full awareness or intent, self-defense scenarios contemplate
affirmative conduct by one party that directly threatens the other's life.7 °
Indeed, abortion does not appear to fit within traditional legal
definitions of self-defense. A person is allowed to defend herself against an
unlawful force, but her own force must be proportional to the force used
against her. Thus, in most jurisdictions (and under the Model Penal Code), a
person can only use lethal force when it is necessary to defend against an
unlawful, lethal force. 71 This means that a non-life-saving abortion is
unlawful lethal force if the embryo or fetus is a person, because the embryo
or fetus did not exert lethal force against the woman.
Even life-saving abortions may not be justified as self-defense
under criminal law. Although in such circumstances the embryo or fetus is
arguably imposing "lethal force" on the woman, it is not unlawful forcethe fetus is innocently there, just as much a victim of circumstance as the
woman (in fact, the woman may even be considered morally culpable for
helping to create the situation if she had engaged in consensual sex). 72 It
does not appear that even a pregnancy caused by rape or incest would make
the fetus's force "unlawful," since the force that was unlawful (the
is not the force against which the woman is now defending
intercourse)
73
herself.
70

See United States v. Peterson, 483 F.2d 1222, 1233 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Davis,

supra note 65, at 186; see also Kimberly Ferzan, Defending Imminence: From Battered
Women to Iraq, 46 ARIz. L. Rav. 213, 262 (2004); Nancy J. Hirschmann, Abortion, SelfDefense, and Involuntary Servitude, 13 TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 41, 47 (2004). But see JOSHUA
DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 298 & n. 67 (5th ed. 2009) (characterizing a
mountaineer who slips off of a cliff and imperils the life of his companion, to whom he is

tethered, as an "aggressor" who might trigger "an expansive version of self-defense").
71 See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.04 (1962). The Model Penal Code also
contains a "defense of others" justification for murder where someone else's life is in danger,
such that a person employing self-defense to save her life may enlist others to help her. See
id. § 3.05. This should protect a doctor who provided an abortion that was justified under the
Model Penal Code or a similar provision.
72

See infra Part II.B.

73 But cf West, supra note 66, at 130 (arguing abortion should be legal in cases of
rape since "never do states hold a crime victim himself criminally liable ... for seeking to
resist having his physical body used, against his will, so as to sustain the life or well-being of
another").
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In the abortion context, self-defense arguments are really more
about self-preservation, and when seen in this light, their persuasiveness
dwindles. They are about self-preservation because the embryo or fetus has
not placed itself in its situation by any deliberate or affirmative act. It is
simply in the wrong place at the wrong time. The law generally does not
condone killing a person who, through no fault of her own, finds herself in a
position that would harm another.7 4 A fetus can be compared to a child
caught with its family, hiding in a closet from intruders in their home. If the
child begins to cry, threatening to give away the family's location, it would
not be considered self-defense if the family were to smother the child.75
Likewise, if a father were trapped in a lifeboat with his child, but the
lifeboat could hold only one, it would not be considered self-defense if the
76
father pushed the child overboard in order to save his own life.
Conjoined twins offer perhaps the most compelling analogy to
pregnancy both because such twins are physically attached to one another
and because they are biologically related (unlike the subjects of Thomson's
violinist example). Assume a set of adult, competent conjoined twins, and
assume further that one twin (the "independent twin") would survive if the
pair were surgically separated and the other (the "dependent twin") would
not. It would not constitute self-defense if the independent twin were
unilaterally to obtain surgery to remove the dependent twin, leading to the
latter's death.7 7
Self-preservation arguments for abortion are especially problematic
when it comes to so-called "elective" abortions, by which most people
74See TRIBE, supra note 66, at 122.
75Whether a prosecutor would actually choose to prosecute such a horrific case is
not relevant. The question is whether such conduct would be prohibited by our criminal
laws.

See, e.g., Regina v. Dudley and Stephens, 14 Q.B.D. 273 (1884) (holding
shipwrecked sailors guilty of murder after they killed and consumed an ailing companion to
permit their continued survival); see also United States v. Holmes, 26 F. Cas. 360 (E.D. Pa.
1842) (jury convicted crewman of murder for throwing numerous passengers overboard to
ensure crowded lifeboat did not sink).
76

77See TRIBE, supra note 66, at 121. Where (i) infants are conjoined and (ii) a thirdparty neutral is presiding, decisions have been made to separate conjoined twins in order to
save one twin's life. See, e.g., Re A, 4 All ER 961 (2000) (British court authorized hospital
to separate conjoined twin infants in an effort to save one of the twins); Charles I. Lugosi,
Playing God: Mary Must Die So Jodie May Live Longer, ISSUES IN L. & MEDICINE, Oct. 1,

2001(discussing case). But it is difficult to imagine that we would allow a mature,
independent twin to order the death of her dependent twin, especially if the independent
twin's life were not at risk. See TRIBE, supra note 66, at 121.
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mean abortions of pregnancies that pose no physical threat to the life or
health of the woman. It is hard to imagine a situation where we would
consider it morally acceptable for a person to kill a baby--especially her
own-because the baby is inconveniencing her, or even because the baby is
threatening her emotional well-being. 78 When desperate teenage girls leave
their newborn babies in the trash or the toilet,
the public is quick to
79
condemn their conduct as morally unspeakable.
Although self-defense does not appear to justify abortions, a
woman might invoke a necessity defense.80 However, a necessity defense
typically requires that the harm that the defendant caused by violating the
law be less serious than the harm she sought to avoid. Where a woman's
life is not at risk, nine months of pregnancy (and perhaps non-lifelife.
threatening health consequences) must be weighed against a person's
81
This does not seem to meet the requirements for a necessity defense.
On the other hand, if the woman's life is at risk and the fetus is not
viable, the woman could argue that a greater harm (the death of both the
embryo or fetus and the woman) is averted if the abortion is allowed and the
woman lives.8 2 However, many state statutes (and the common law) also
require that the woman have clean hands. Unless the woman could prove
that the sex that caused her pregnancy was nonconsensual, a court might

78 See Davis, supra note 65, at 10; see also Chemerinsky, supra note 17, at 124.

("Society does not allow parents to kill infants even though infants are a burden and an
infringement of privacy. Thus, only by assuming that the fetus is not a human person until
viability can the Court justify allowing abortions prior to viability based on a privacy
rationale.") (internal citations omitted).
79 See, e.g., Robert Hanley, Teen-Agers Get Terms in Prison In Baby's Death, N.Y.
TIMES, July 10, 1998, at Al; see also Steven Pinker, Why They Kill Their Newborns, N.Y.

TIMES, Nov. 2, 1997, at SM52.
80

There is a choice-of-evils defense (or necessity defense) in the Model Penal

Code. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.02(1) (1962). Necessity is also a common law defense in
the United States. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.02(1) cmt. at 10 (1962).
S Some states preclude the defense altogether in cases of homicide, see, e.g.,

People v. Trippet, 66 Cal. Rptr. 2d 559 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997), and some allow the defense
only when the danger is caused by natural forces, see, e.g., Cleveland v. Municipality of
Anchorage, 631 P.2d 1072 (Alaska 1981).
82 If the woman's pregnancy is sufficiently advanced, however, it may be possible
to save the fetus at the woman's expense. Cf In re A.C., 573 A.2d 1235 (D.C. App. 1990)
(overturning lower court ruling that had permitted hospital to perform a cesarean section on a
terminally ill woman against her will, in an unsuccessful attempt to save her fetus).
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find unclean hands.83 Moreover, some states that have not adopted the
Model Penal Code version of the necessity defense require that the person
invoking the defense be faced with a "clear and imminent danger." 84 A
woman who obtained an abortion in order to avoid a potential risk to her
life might fail this test if a court did not deem her fear of death reasonable.
Similarly, depending on how a court construed the requirement of
"imminence," a court might not allow the defense where a woman obtained
an early abortion in order to avoid an anticipated risk to her life later in
pregnancy.
C. Liberals' Unsuccessful Attempts to Bracket the Question of
Embryonic or Fetal Personhood
In the end, though, self-defense and self-preservation arguments are
a sideshow for liberals arguing in favor of the right to abortion, because
liberals do not in fact believe that the law should recognize the fetus as a
person. Instead, liberals typically take the position that the morality of
abortion (or whether the fetus is a person) is a deeply personal, and often
religious, matter that each person should decide for herself. Although "[t]he
fact that a moral belief may be rooted in religious conviction neither
85
exempts it from challenge nor renders it incapable of rational defense,"
the Court and most liberal commentators have shrunk from either
challenging the belief that an embryo 86
or fetus is a person or from
demanding a rational defense of that claim.
83 See, e.g., People v. Pepper, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d 877, 880 (Cal. Ct. App 1996). The
Model Penal Code (which includes a broader necessity defense than under common law or
many non-Code-based statutes) does not require that the woman have "clean hands," so her
"fault" in becoming pregnant would not be at issue in a state that had adopted it. See MODEL
PENAL CODE § 3.02(1) (1962).
84 See,

e.g., Commonwealth v. Schuchardt, 557 N.E.2d 1380, 1381 (Mass. 1990).

85 MICHAEL J. SANDEL, THE CASE AGAINST PERFECTION: ETHICS IN THE AGE OF
GENETIC ENGINEERING

104 (2007) [hereinafter

SANDEL, ETHICS & GENETIC ENGINEERING].

86 See, e.g., Chemerinsky, supra note 17, at 142-44; John Hart Ely, The Wages of

Crying Wolf A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE L.J. 920, 927 (1973); see also
DWORKIN, supra note 10, at 102 (noting that many of Roe's "most sophisticated critics"
argue "not that the Court's opinion on these great philosophical issues was wrong but that it
had no business ruling on the matter at all, because the Constitution gives democratically
elected state legislatures ... the power to decide"). Even the most conservative members of
the Court have bracketed the question of when personhood begins, by asserting that the
question should be decided by the majoritarian process. See infra Part II.A.
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Justice Blackmun's opinion in Roe v. Wade exemplified liberal
avoidance by declaring that the Court could not answer the question of
when life begins. 87 Texas, however, had asserted that "life begins at
conception and is present throughout pregnancy, and that, therefore, the
State has a compelling interest in protecting that life from and after
conception." 88 Interestingly, in the oral arguments in Roe, the Justices
seemed keenly aware of the need to decide the question of embryonic or
fetal personhood.89 In the second round of oral arguments, several Justices
pressed the issue with counsel for both sides. For example, Justice Stewart
questioned Robert C. Flowers, counsel for Texas:
JUSTICE STEWART: Well, if you're right that an unborn fetus
is a person, then you can't leave it to the legislature to play fast
and loose dealing with that person. In other words, if you're
correct, in your basic submission that an unborn fetus is a person,
then abortion laws such as that which New York has are grossly
unconstitutional, isn't it?
MR. FLOWERS: That's right, yes.
JUSTICE STEWART: Allowing the killing of people.
MR. FLOWERS: Yes, sir.
JUSTICE STEWART: A person.
MR. FLOWERS: Your Honor, in Massachusetts, I might point
outJUSTICE STEWART: You can't leave it up to the legislature.
It's a constitutional problem, isn't it?
MR. FLOWERS: Well, if there would be any exceptions within
this-

87Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 159 (1973).
88

id.

89Oral argument was heard in the case first on December 13, 1971 (before seven
Justices, Justices Black and Harlan having suddenly retired), and again on October 11, 1972
(before a full Court). See LINDA GREENHOUSE, BECOMING JUSTICE BLACKMUN: HARRY
BLACKMUN'S SUPREME COURT JOURNEY 80-93 (2005).
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JUSTICE STEWART: The basic constitutional question,
initially, is whether or not an unborn fetus is a person, isn't it?
MR. FLOWERS: Yes, sir, and entitled to the constitutional
protection.
90
JUSTICE STEWART: And that's critical to this case, is it not?

Yet when it came time to write the opinion, the Justices preferred to
dodge the personhood question. The Roe majority at first seemed to
acknowledge the morally fraught nature of the abortion decision:
We forthwith acknowledge our awareness of the sensitive and
emotional nature of the abortion controversy, of the vigorous
opposing views, even among physicians, and of the deep and
seemingly absolute convictions that the subject inspires. One's
philosophy, one's experiences, one's exposure to the raw edges
of human existence, one's religious training, one's attitudes
toward life and family and their values, and the moral standards
one established and seeks to observe, are all likely to influence
9
and color one's thinking and conclusions about abortion. 1
The Court went on to say, however, that it would resolve the issue
"free of emotion and of predilection." 92 It flirted with rejecting outright the

notion of fetal personhood, pointing out, for example, that the "unborn have
never been recognized in the law as persons in the whole sense. 93 It also
asserted that Texas was wrong in "adopting one theory of life . . . [which

would] override the rights of the pregnant woman that are at stake." 94 The
Court recognized that "[i]f this suggestion of fetal personhood is
established, the appellant's case, of course, collapses, for the fetus' right to
life would then be guaranteed specifically by the Amendment." 95 Thus, by
90 Transcript of Oral Reargument, Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (No. 70-18),

http://www.oyez.org/cases/1970-1979/1971/1971 70_18/reargument/.
accompanying note 173, infra.
91Roe, 410 U.S. at 116.
92 id.

9

Id. at 162.

941d.

" Id. at 156-57.

See

also

text
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upholding the right to abortion, the Court did in fact resolve the debate to
this extent: it implicitly denied that an embryo or fetus is a constitutional
person.
Yet, the Court ultimately purported to deflect the question of
embryonic or fetal personhood, noting "the wide divergence of thinking on
this most sensitive and difficult question." 96 It quoted approvingly Justice
Holmes's famous dissent in Lochner v. New York, which stated that the
Constitution is "made for people of fundamentally differing views." 97 The
Court thus suggested that it was not its place to impose one moral view of
abortion upon the nation. Blackmun's opinion suggested that there were
multiple "theories" about when life begins and implied that these theories
could coexist without the Court directly denying or endorsing any of
them. 98 Thus, the Court concluded, "We need not resolve the difficult
question of when life begins. When those trained in the respective
disciplines of medicine, philosophy, and theology are unable to arrive at
any consensus, the judiciary .
99

is not in a position to speculate as to the

answer."
Ironically, while it declared itself unable to decide when an embryo
becomes a person, the Court in Roe assumed away the answer to the equally
if not more vexing question of when "meaningful life" begins. 100
Blackmun's opinion identified fetal viability as the point at which the
government's interest in the fetus becomes sufficiently compelling to deny
women abortions unless their lives or health are threatened. The opinion
asserted that, at viability, "the fetus then presumably has the capability of
meaningful life outside the mother's womb."10 1 This casual remark left an
enormously complex and uncertain medical inquiry wholly untouched.
Whether and when a fetus is sufficiently mature to survive outside the
uterus in any condition is inevitably an educated guess, measured in
96

Id. at 160.

97

Id. at 117 (quoting Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 76 (1905) (Holmes, J.,

dissenting)).
98See Roe, 410 U.S. at 162 ("In view of all this, we do not agree that, by adopting

one theory of life, Texas may override the rights of the pregnant woman that are at stake.").
99

Id. at 159.
1oQ
See DAVID L.

FAIGMAN, CONSTITUTIONAL FICTIONS

5 (2008) ("[I]n Roe the

Court rejected a state's definition of life but assumed the task of constitutionally defining
what constituted 'meaningful life."').
"' Roe, 410 U.S. at 163.
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percentages rather than absolutes, and affected by numerous factors,
including the technology and medical expertise available. And the bare
question of survival does not even begin to answer whether a fetus's
prematurity could at some point mean impairments so severe that its life
could not fairly be called "meaningful." Moreover, assuming we know what
a "meaningful life" is, of what relevance is it that a fetus could have a
meaningful life outside the woman's body when the fetus is still in the
woman's body? As David Faigman notes, "nobody at the time [of Roe] or
since has suggested that women can remove
twenty-four-week-old fetuses
10 2
so that they might fend for themselves.
Liberals who "bracket" (or deflect) the moral question of
embryonic or fetal personhood often avow a profound respect for the views
of those who see the fetus as a person. Thus, in a 2004 presidential debate,
for example, John Kerry claimed to "deeply respect" the view that the fetus
is a person, while also saying that this view should not be imposed on
everyone.10 3 The Supreme Court took a similar stance in Planned
Parenthoodv. Casey, even as it upheld (albeit in limited fashion) the right
to abortion declared in Roe. Thus, the controlling opinion ringingly
affirmed the right of the individual to decide when personhood begins: "At
the heart of liberty is the right to define one's own concept of existence, of
meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human life. Beliefs about
these matters could not define the attributes of personhood were they
formed under the compulsion of the State. 10 4
102FAIGMAN, supra note 100, at 5; see also William Saletan, Fetal Separation,
SLATE,

July 21, 2008, http://www.slate.com/blogs/blogs/humannature/archive/2008/07/2 1/

fetal-separation.aspx. ("I have to say, it's a relief to learn that the embryo is so complete and
independent. I mean, it solves the whole problem. Here's this woman who just wants to be
separated from her embryo. And lo and behold, it's already separate! No need to agonize.
Just detach it and let it grow.").
103In

the second presidential debate in 2004, Kerry was asked what he would say

to a voter who believed abortion is murder. Kerry said that he would give this response:
I cannot tell you how deeply I respect the belief about life and when it
begins. I'm a Catholic, raised a Catholic. I was an altar boy. Religion has
been a huge part of my life. It helped lead me through a war, leads me
today. But, I can't take what is an article of faith for me and legislate it
for someone who doesn't share that article of faith, whether they be
agnostic, atheist, Jew, Protestant, whatever. I can't do that.
John Kerry, The Second Bush-Kerry
http://www.debates.org/pages/trans2004c.html.
104

added).

Presidential

Debate

(Oct.

8,

2004),

Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992) (emphasis
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Perhaps when liberals (or the Court) profess to respect individuals'
right to define personhood, they simply mean that they assume the good
faith of those who hold such a view. If so, then these statements make a
minimal point that is not necessarily inconsistent with rejecting legal
personhood for embryos or fetuses. This minimal level of "respect" would
presumably seem woefully inadequate to those who hold the opposing
view. However, if instead liberals (or the Court) mean to suggest that they
grant the validity or potential validity of these views, then the statements
are disingenuous, if well-intentioned. Many moral questions may be left to
individual interpretation and belief, but personhood in the abortion debate is
too weighty an ethical concern to leave publicly unanswered. If we
contemplate the killing of any other class of potential persons-slaves, for
example-it is obvious that this moral question cannot be left to personal
choice, and that declining to answer the question is just another way of
answering it (by rejecting the belief). As Sandel points out, the Court's
desire "to bracket the intractable controversy over abortion" is akin to
Stephen Douglas's proposal "to bracket the intractable controversy over
slavery-by refusing to impose a single answer on the country as a
whole. 10 5 To argue for a right to abortion is effectively to reject claims of
embryonic or fetal personhood. 10 6 Even Thomas Nagel, who argues (against
Sandel) that liberals can successfully bracket questions about the morality
of much conduct, including abortion,' °7 seems to agree that one cannot
bracket the ultimate question of fetal personhood and abortion without
implicitly answering it, and that only lesser disagreements about the embryo
or fetus's moral status can be bracketed. 10 8
Liberals' asserted respect for claims of fetal personhood therefore
does not withstand rigorous scrutiny. Moreover, in professing such respect,
105Sandel, MoralArgument, supra note 28, at 532.

106 It is akin to someone saying, "I respect your belief that taking blood into the
body through the mouth or veins violates God's laws." See Watchtower.org, Blood-Vital
for Life, http://www.watchtower.org/e/hb/article_01.htm

(last visited Oct. 1, 2009). If a

person then argues in favor of the availability of blood transfusions, she reveals that she in
fact officially rejects that belief. She is saying, in effect, "It's fine with me if you hold that
view, but please keep it to yourself."
107See Thomas Nagel, Progressive but Not Liberal, THE N.Y. REV. OF BOOKS,
May 25, 2006, at 46-47 (reviewing MICHAEL J. SANDEL, PUBLIC PHILOSOPHY: ESSAYS ON
MORALITY IN POLITICS (2005)).

108
See Nagel, supra note 9, at 57 (for one who holds the religious view that
"abortion is as bad as killing a child," requirement of equal respect among citizens will likely
be insufficient to persuade her that abortion must remain available).
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liberals miss the opportunity to affirm the woman's moral agency and the
fact that abortion is often a morally defensible and even laudable decision
for a woman who finds herself with an unintended pregnancy.' 0 9 Rather
than seeing the legal right to abortion as accommodating and enabling
moral agency on the part of women, and recognizing that women often
choose abortion for morally good reasons, the liberal position simply claims
that the law has no role to play in influencing women's moral choices.
However, this has led to a perception of abortion as a selfish, morally
bankrupt choice.
The same phenomenon has occurred in the context of same-sex
intimacy and same-sex relationships. So long as those who claim to support
such rights assert respect for the moral misgivings of those who do not, as
many democratic legislators have," 10 their arguments appear weak and lack
credibility."' An argument in support of same-sex relationships that is
premised on a separation of law and morality asserts that-whatever one
thinks of the morality of such relationship--the law has no place in
governing them. But this view allows a perception of same-sex
relationships as morally questionable, or even wrong, to persist. Ultimately,
to argue for full equality for lesbians and gay men will require a direct
challenge to the factual and moral validity of arguments against same-sex

109See Caitlin Borgmann & Catherine Weiss, Beyond Apocalypse and Apology: A

Moral Defense ofAbortion, 35 PERSP. ON SEXUAL & REPROD. HEALTH 40 (2003).

110 For example, many liberal politicians express support for same-sex equality and
yet make exceptions for marriage based on moral arguments against marriage equality. See,
e.g.,

Onthelssues.org,

Hillary

Clinton

on

Gay

Rights,

http://www.ontheissues.org/Domestic/HillaryClintonCivilRights.htm#GayRights
(last
visited Oct. 1, 2009) ("Marriage has historic, religious, and moral content that goes back to
the beginning of time, and I think a marriage is as a marriage has always been, between a
man
and a
woman.");
Onthelssues.org,
John
Kerry
on
Gay
Rights,
http://www.ontheissues.org/2008/JohnKerryCivil Rights.htm#GayRights (last visited
Oct. 1, 2009) (When asked, "You also said that you believe the Defense of Marriage Act was
fundamentally unconstitutional[?]" Kerry responded, "I was incorrect in that statement. I
think, in fact, that no state has to recognize something that is against their public policy.").
1 See Sandel, MoralArgument, supra note 28, at 532.

The Meaning of "Life"

2009]

575

relationships 1 2 and a forthright defense of the moral worth of these
1
associations and the appropriateness of affording them legal protection. 3
On the other hand, if liberals genuinely respect the possibility that
the embryo or fetus is a person, then their position to allow abortions is
untenable. As scholars have pointed out, if one is personally unsure whether
an embryo or fetus is a person-that is, if one thinks it is possible that it
may be a person-then one cannot risk allowing abortion. 114 Imagine that a
person is hunting in the woods. Suddenly she makes out an indistinct shape
moving through the trees. She is unsure whether it is a deer or a person.
Nearly everyone would agree that, given her uncertainty, she ought not to
shoot at the object. If someone urged her not to shoot, it would not be
reasonable for her to respond, "You may be right that it is a person. But it's
just as likely to be a deer. Since I'm not sure either way, I'm going to
shoot."' 1 5 Frances J. Beckwith gives a different example to illustrate the

same point:
112 See Caitlin E. Borgmann, Rethinking Judicial Deference to Legislative Fact-

Finding, 84 IND. L.J. 1, 33-37, 51-60 (2009); Suzanne B. Goldberg, Morals-Based
Justificationsfor Lawmaking: Before and After Lawrence v. Texas, 88 MINN. L. REV. 1233,
1307-10 (2004).
113 See, e.g., Carlos A. Ball, Sexual Ethics and Postmodernism in Gay Rights
Philosophy, 80 N.C. L. REV. 371 (2002); Chai R. Feldblum, Sexual Orientation, Morality,
and the Law. Devlin Revisited, 57 U. PITT. L. REV. 237 (1996).
114 See Judith Jarvis Thomson, Abortion, BOSTON REV., Summer 1995, at 11-16,

available at http://bostonreview.net/BR20.3/thomson.htm (arguing that positions for and
against fetal personhood are equally reasonable); see also Chemerinsky, supra note 17
(arguing same). This view has rightly been criticized by both supporters (e.g., Michael
Sandel) and opponents (e.g., Frances Beckwith) of abortion rights. See Sandel, Moral
Argument, supra note 28; Frances J. Beckwith, Thomson's "Equal Reasonableness"
Argument for Abortion Rights: A Critique, 49 AM. J. JURIS. 185, 197 (2004). But see Michael
Stokes Paulsen, Dissenting, in WHAT ROE V. WADE SHOULD HAVE SAID, supra note 66, at
211. Oddly, Paulsen seems to assume that uncertainty about the embryo or fetus's status
merely makes it permissible for the state to ban it (while if it is clear that it is human life,
state cannot refuse to protect it.). Thus, Paulsen asserts that if there is "even a good basis for
believing that the human fetus is a human life, then surely the state may protect that life," and
its interest is compelling and trumps the woman's privacy and autonomy claims. Paulsen is
inconsistent on this point, however. He argues that, even if the fetus is not a constitutional
person, "surely there is a 'compelling' or 'subordinating' state interest in protecting human
life, at all stages, from being killed by other human beings." Id.at 208. Paulsen also says that
no conceivable liberty interest on the part of the woman could trump the state interest in
protecting "human life from being killed." Id.
115 Of course, this example poses no countervailing risk in the hunter's refraining

from shooting. A person unsure of the embryo or fetus's moral status must weigh that
uncertainty against the certainty of imposing pregnancy upon women against their will,

ColumbiaJournalof Gender andLaw

[Vol. 18:2

Imagine the police are able to identify someone as a murderer
with only one piece of evidence: his DNA matches the DNA of
the genetic material found on the victim. The police subsequently
arrest him, and he is convicted and sentenced to death. Suppose,
however, that it is discovered several months later that the
murderer has an identical twin brother who was also at the scene
of the crime and obviously has the same DNA as his brother on
death row. This means that there is a 50/50 chance that the man
on death row is the murderer. Would the state be justified in
executing this man? Surely not, for there is a 50/50 chance of
executing an innocent person. Consequently, if it is wrong to kill
the man on death row, it is then wrong to kill the fetus when the
arguments for its full
humanity are just as reasonable as the
116
arguments against it.
Like liberals, the Supreme Court cannot uphold the constitutional
right to abortion without at least implicitly rejecting embryonic or fetal
personhood 1 1 7 The Constitution guarantees certain protections, including
equal protection of the laws, to all persons. While the Court can bracket
some-in fact most-moral questions under the Constitution, personhood is
not one of them. 18 As Faigman points out:
When life begins and when it ends must necessarily be decided as
a matter of constitutional interpretation, because basic guarantees
depend on it .... However-much the Court might want to avoid

making some women suffer health consequences, and so on. A closer analogy in the hunting
context might posit that the hunter had been lost in the woods for days without food.
However, a closer examination of countervailing concerns in the abortion context (as well as
the hunting analogy) shows that solicitude for those concerns still does not justify the risk of
taking a person's life. See supra Part I.B.
116See,

e.g., Beckwith, supra note 114, at 197.

17 See,

e.g., FAIGMAN, supra note 100, at 14; STEPHEN L. CARTER, THE CULTURE

252-53
(1993); Sandel, Moral Argument, supra note 28, at 532; McConnell, supra note 35, at 118587; Chemerinsky, supra note 17, at 124.
OF DISBELIEF: How AMERICAN LAW AND POLITICS TRIVIALIZE RELIGIOUS DEVOTION

118The Court could bracket the more limited question whether a state might
recognize a particular group as "persons" for state law purposes even though the Court had
rejected personhood for this group for federal constitutional purposes. For example, a state
could define a cow as a "person" under state law. In such a case, the Court would still have
to answer whether this recognition violated the constitutional rights of anyone recognized as
a person under the federal Constitution. And in refusing to grant constitutional protection to
cows, the Court itself would effectively reject bovine personhood.
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the question, or appear not to have to answer it, the definition of
life, at least at the margins, is a subject necessarily
inherent in the
119
meaning of certain constitutional guarantees.
If the Supreme Court were to consider a state law that permitted
parents to kill their infants up to one year of age, the Court could not simply
decline to answer whether such infants are "persons" protected by the
Constitution. If the Court purported to bracket the question of infants'
personhood, and at the same time declared a constitutional right of parents
to kill their infant children, it would be clear to all that the Court had in fact
decided, and rejected, the question of infants' personhood. Thus, when the
Supreme Court confronted, first in Roe v. Wade and later in Webster v.
Reproductive Health Services,120 government assertions that the embryo or
fetus is a person, it was forced to respond and implicitly did so
(notwithstanding its protestations otherwise). As John T. Noonan claims,
the Court's "professed agnosticism [in Roe v. Wade] as to when life begins
is not a morally neutral position; it is a rejection
of a fundamental postulate
121
of the law the decision holds unconstitutional."'
Stephen L. Carter likewise argues that the liberal position on
abortion amounts to denying that the fetus is a person. Carter contends that
liberals' reliance on a modem version of John Stuart Mill's harm principle,
which holds that one cannot impose moral judgments on others through the
law except to prevent harm to others, 122 unfairly assumes what is to be
proved-that the fetus is not a person that can be harmed. 23 Carter, who
opposes abortion, claims that any fair argument in favor of the right to
abortion must assume that the fetus is a person. "[T]he right to choose
abortion, if indeed it survives, must be based on an approach that allows
abortion even if the fetus is human-instead of an approach that denies that
humanity under cover of the pretense that the definition is none of the
state's business."'' 24 While Carter is right that a defense of the right to
119 FAIGMAN,

supra note 100, at 14.

120 492 U.S. 490, 505 (1989) (interpreting statutory preamble, which provided that
"[t]he life of each human being begins at conception," to have no effect on the provision of
abortions in Missouri).
121 John

T. Noonan, Posner's Problematics, 111 HARV. L. REv. 1768, 1772 n.24

(1998) (footnote omitted).
122 See JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 13 (Gateway 1955).
123

CARTER, supra note 117, at 255-56.

124

id. at 257.
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abortion must address directly the question of personhood, his position is
untenable. It cannot be that the government must assume the validity of
every religious belief and can justify regulations only on grounds consistent
with those beliefs. In a pluralistic society, the government
must be able to
1 25
reject some beliefs as unreasonable or implausible.
II. DEBUNKING EMBRYONIC AND FETAL PERSONHOOD
A. Reevaluating Conservative Claims of Embryonic and Fetal
Personhood
Opposing abortion on the grounds that it is murder is a fairly recent
approach in the United States. Before the nineteenth century, the abortion
debate in this country was not rooted in claims that the embryo or fetus is a
person. 126 Abortion was not illegal in any state until 1821.127 Early abortion
laws were motivated, not by concern for the embryo or fetus, but by the
medical profession's desire to protect its turf, as well as by nativist concerns
that Catholic28 immigrants were procreating at higher rates than white
Protestants. 1
Interestingly, the shift toward viewing the embryo or fetus as a
person marked an attempt to move away from rather than toward framing
the debate in purely moral terms. As Kristin Luker explains, when
nineteenth century physicians mobilized against abortion, they "shifted the
focus of the debate from moral values to empirical facts," by asserting that
they were newly in possession about facts regarding the development of the
embryo and fetus. 129 Luker claims that nineteenth century anti-abortionrights physicians, in order to differentiate themselves from the lay public,
125See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
126 See,

e.g., Jed Rubenfeld, Concurring in the Judgment Except as to Doe, in

WHAT ROE V. WADE SHOULD HAVE SAID, supra note 66, at 113 ("The idea that a fertilized
ovum is an independent human being fro/m the moment of conception is a relatively new
one-medically, morally, and legally." (citing legal authorities)).
127RISEN & THOMAS,
128

supra note 15, at 7.

See id. at 8-9.

129KRISTIN LUKER, ABORTION AND THE POLITICS OF MOTHERHOOD 26 (Univ. Cal.

Press. 1985). Luker claims that, in fact, there had long been basic medical knowledge that
pregnancy was a continuous process that the late nineteenth-century physicians'
"discoveries" were more "in the nature of technical additions to a generally accepted
principle and were in any event made many years after American physicians mobilized
against abortion." Id. at 25.
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had to be the exclusive ones to see the embryo as a person. But this, she
claims:
[C]reated an unresolvable paradox for physicians, a paradox that
would haunt the abortion debate until the present day. If the
embryo is a full human life, as these physicians claimed, then
abortion can never be morally right, even when undertaken to
save the life of the mother; the Western tradition does not permit
even physicians to "set aside one life for another." . . . But if

abortion is never morally right, then nineteenth-century
physicians had no grounds for claiming0 it as a medical issue that
required theirprofessionalregulation.13
To acknowledge abortion as murder would require physicians to
tum the issue over to their "competition," the clergy (regarding the moral
implications) and lawyers (regarding the legal implications). In order to
keep control
over the issue, doctors "could not give up either half of the
31
paradox."1

This conundrum continues today for conservatives arguing against
abortion. Conservatives appeal to the public by suggesting that the embryo
or fetus is a person, but their rhetoric is ultimately empty, as they are
unwilling to accept the full moral consequences of equating embryos and
fetuses with persons. The rhetoric of "life," "human being," and
"motherhood," so frequently employed by opponents of abortion rights, is
highly misleading. Yet, public discourse about abortion rarely demands
clarification of these terms. For most listeners, a description of abortion as
the taking of "human life" instinctively conjures up personhood. In keeping
with the liberal approach, most listeners therefore simply assume that
conservatives mean personhood when they talk about life, rather than
engaging conservatives in a discussion about the ambiguity. But saying that
the fetus is a "life" or even a "human being," or that the pregnant woman is
a "mother" is not the same as saying that the fetus is a full, rights-holding
person. Indeed, as this Article demonstrates, many conservatives approach
the abortion debate in a way that suggests that this is not in fact how they
view the embryo or fetus (or, at best, suggests that they are
inconsistent in
1 32
sometimes viewing the fetus a person and sometimes not).
30

1

Id. at 31-32.

131Id. at

32.

132 See infra Part I.B.
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It is significant that even many adamant opponents of abortion
rights, including Justice Scalia, "bracket" the question of personhood.' 33
These conservatives do not argue that an embryo or fetus should be
considered a person under the Constitution. Rather, they argue that each
13 4
state should be permitted to decide the legal status of an embryo or fetus.
In Carhart I, Justice Scalia urged in dissent, "[F]or the sake of its own
preservation, the Court should return [the abortion] matter to the people...
and let them decide, State by State, whether this practice should be
allowed." 135 Conservative Justices would leave the moral question of
abortion for legislatures to decide, and liberal Justices would let women
decide, but both are ways of attempting to bracket the question. 36 Noonan
criticizes Judge Richard Posner for engaging in this kind of bracketing on
abortion:
Posner appears to take refuge in the controversial character of
modem morals.... For him "[d]ifficult moral questions" must be
"indeterminate." We have two cultures on abortion. Who can say
which is right? That is Posner's question. But as far as present
law goes, the Supreme Court has adopted the morals of the proabortion cause: legally, abortion is a liberty, a human good that
137
can be limited only in peripheral fashion.
Noonan is right to argue that the question of personhood cannot be
left "indeterminate." Conservative Justices, no less than liberal Justices, are
necessarily called upon to answer the question of embryonic and fetal
personhood. Although the Court may choose to tread lightly in imposing
moral judgments on society as a whole, personhood is fundamental not only
to questions of morality but to the meaning of the Constitution and the
133 See

DwORKN, supra note 10, at 102 (noting that many of Roe's "most

sophisticated critics" argue "not that the Court's opinion on these great philosophical issues
was wrong but that it had no business ruling on the matter at all, because the Constitution
gives democratically elected state legislatures.

. .

the power to decide").

134In upholding the federal Partial Birth Abortion Ban Act, the conservative
Justices also seemed to accept that Congress may assert interests in the fetus, although
Justice Thomas concurred separately to note that the question of Congress's power to enact
the ban was not before the Court. See Gonzales v. Carhart (CarhartI), 550 U.S. 124, 169
(2007) (Thomas, J., concurring).
' CarhartI,

530 U.S. at 956 (Scalia, J., dissenting).

136
See Sandel, MoralArgument, supra note 28, at 532-33.
137 Noonan, supra note 121, at 1172.
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scope of its guarantees. Once this country was finally morally compelled to
acknowledge the personhood of slaves, it would have been unacceptable for
the Court (or the country) to dodge the question whether the Constitution
protected them equally as persons. 138 In leaving unresolved the question of
embryonic or fetal personhood, conservative Justices, like their liberal
colleagues, implicitly deny that embryos and fetuses are persons.
The implicit denial of personhood among conservative Justices
coincides with the policy positions of even the most conservative
politicians. Conservatives who appear to hold restrictive views of abortion
typically do not consistently treat the embryo or fetus as the moral
equivalent of a constitutional person. They often profess a belief that
personhood begins the moment a human egg is fertilized. Yet an
examination of their policy positions suggests that few would grant an
embryo all of the rights of a constitutionally recognized person. Instead,
conservative politicians commonly adopt a contextual view of when
abortion should be banned. Senator John McCain, for example, remarked at
a news conference in 2000:
After a lot of study, a lot of consultation and a lot of prayer, I
came up with a position that I believe there should be an
exception for rape, incest or the life of a mother. . . . [The
abortion issue] is one of the most difficult and agonizing issues
that I think all of us face, because 39of our belief-yours and
mine-that life begins at conception.]
President George W. Bush likewise favored rape and incest
exceptions-although McCain took him to task for refusing to advocate for
formal changes to the Republican Party platform abortion plank, which
does not mention rape, incest, or life-of-the-woman exceptions. 140 Rape and
41
incest exceptions cannot be justified if the embryo or fetus is a person.'
The 2008 Republican Vice Presidential nominee, Governor Sarah
Palin, apparently held a more restrictive position on abortion than her
138 See supra note 105 and accompanying text.

139 Alison Mitchell, The 2000 Campaign: The Infighting: McCain Faults
Landmark Abortion Decision, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 22, 2000, at A 10 (emphases added).
140 See Teddy Davis, McCain Poised to Flip on GOP Abortion Platform,

ABCNEWS.COM, May 9, 2008, http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/Vote2008/story?id=4824779.
141 See DWORKIN, supra note 10, at 97; TRIBE, supra note 66, at 132; Borgmann
&
Weiss, supra note 109, at 42; supra Part I.B.; infra note 170 and accompanying text.
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running mate, rejecting any exceptions for rape and incest. 142 Yet, when her
teenage daughter faced an unplanned pregnancy and decided against
abortion, Palin's press release emphasized her daughter's autonomy in the
matter, remarking that Palin and her husband were "proud of Bristol's
decision., 143 In a later interview, Palin described her own position on
abortion as her "personal opinion," 144 again implying that a person's views
on the subject are properly a matter of individual choice.
The Republican Party's 2004 platform began with an extremesounding statement on abortion that appeared consistent with fetal
personhood:
[W]e say the unborn child has a fundamental individual right to
life which cannot be infringed. We support a human life
amendment to the Constitution and we endorse legislation to
make it clear that the Fourteenth Amendment's protections apply
to unborn children. Our purpose is to have legislative and judicial
45
protection of that right against those who perform abortions. 1
It is telling, however, that the party singled out "those who perform
abortions." The platform's elaboration of the abortion plank made clear that
only abortion providers should be punished:
Our goal is to ensure that women with problem pregnancies have
the kind of support, material and otherwise, they need for
themselves and for their babies, not to be punitive towards those
for whose difficult situation we have only compassion. We
142Dawson Bell, Views of VP Picks Examined; Palin, Biden in Spotlight for
Stances on Abortion, Gun Rights, DETROIT FREE PRESS, Sept. 14, 2008, at 15; see also Matt
Volz, All Three Candidates Support Gas Line Lawsuit, ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS, Nov. 3,

2006, available at http://www.adn.com/news/politics/elections/story/44943.html
Palin that she would "choose life" over abortion if her daughter were raped).

(quoting

143Dana Bash, Palin's Teen Daughter Is Pregnant, CNN.CoM, Sept. 2, 2008,
http://www.cnn.com/2008/POLITICS/09/01/palin.daughter. Defenders of the Governor
similarly described the pregnancy as "a very private matter." See id. But if Palin's daughter
were deciding whether or not to kill her newborn baby, the public would surely feel that it
had a legitimate interest in how the incident was resolved.
144 Michael Luo, Working Mother Questions 'Irrelevant,' Palin Says, N.Y. TIMES,

Sept. 13, 2008, at A12.
145GEORGE W. BUSH, 2004 REPUBLICAN PARTY PLATFORM: A SAFER WORLD AND A

MORE HOPEFUL
2004platform.pdf.

AMERICA
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(2004),

available at

http://www.gop.com/images/
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oppose abortion, but our pro-life agenda does 1not
include
46
punitive action against women who have an abortion.
Republicans' professed compassion for women who obtain
abortions belies any claim that abortion is murder or that an embryo or fetus
is a person. Surely, Republicans would not absolve a woman who solicited
a person to murder her newborn baby, even if she did it out of desperation.
In Texas, a woman who suffered from mental illness and drowned her five
1 47
children narrowly escaped execution and is serving a life sentence.
The Republican Party's confusion over the embryo's moral status
and whether to punish women for abortion is shared by anti-abortion-rights
protestors. A journalist interviewed protestors picketing outside an abortion
clinic in Libertyville, Illinois, in the summer of 2007. He first asked
individual protestors whether abortion should be illegal. Invariably, they
averred that it should be, since it involves the taking of a human life. He
then asked whether women should be punished for obtaining abortions. All
of the protestors appeared surprised by the question and had no ready
answer. When pressed, however, only one protestor thought women should
do prison time for abortions (and even she hesitated, saying that many
factors would first have to be "taken into consideration"). The others
responded that the issue of punishment was between "the woman and her
God," or that her "conscience" should guide her,
or that the woman should
1 48
be treated with love, compassion, and prayer.
Like conservative politicians and abortion protestors, legal scholars
who argue that embryos or fetuses are constitutional persons appear
unwilling to accept the full import of this claim. Stephen L. Carter, for
example, argues that to recognize a fetus as a person under the Fourteenth
Amendment would not necessarily mean that abortion should be banned.
146 Id. The

2008 platform does not address as explicitly whether women should be

punished for abortion, but it does declare, "We all have a moral obligation to assist, not to
penalize, women struggling with the challenges of an unplanned pregnancy." GOP.com,
2008 Republican Party Platform: Values, http://www.gop.com/2008Platform/Values.htm
(last visited Oct. 1, 2009).
147

Timothy Roche, Andrea Yates: More to the Story,

TIME,

Mar. 18, 2002,

available at http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,218445,00.html. Similarly,
Peter Singer's suggestion that it is morally permissible in some circumstances to euthanize

humans, including infants and disabled adults,

PETER SINGER, PRACTICAL ETHICS

175-217

(2d ed. 1993), has prompted stormy objections, see, e.g., Neil MacFarquhar, Protest Over
Princeton'sNew Ethics Professor,N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 22, 1999, at B7.
148 See ATCenterNetwork.com,

Libertyville Abortion Demonstration (July 30,

2007), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Uk6t-tdOkwo (last visited Oct. 1, 2009).
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Carter points out that Robert Bork in his testimony opposing the Human
Life Bill contended that the state could permit some abortions even if the
fetus were deemed a person. 49 Carter himself disagrees with Blackmun's
assertion in Roe that, "Ifthis suggestion of personhood is established, the
[pregnant woman's] case . ..collapses, for the fetus' right to life would
then be guaranteed specifically by the [Fourteenth] Amendment."'' 50 Carter
points out that the amendment only forbids the state to deprive a person of
life without due process
of law and that the state may decline to prohibit
15
murder if it chooses. '

This argument seems flawed. Since every state does prohibit
murder, if embryos were recognized as persons, states that wanted to permit
some abortions would have to rewrite their murder laws to make clear that
abortion was exempted. But if embryos are persons, the Equal Protection
Clause should protect them from this kind of a law. Surely, a state cannot
prohibit murder for some persons but not others without running afoul of
the Equal Protection Clause. 52 While it is true, as Carter points out, that
states can punish the murder of peace officers more severely than the
murder of other people, no state excludes an entire category of persons from
its prohibition on murder. A law that punished murder but exempted the
killing of the elderly, for example, would rightfully be struck down as
unconstitutional.
Michael Stokes Paulsen, another scholar opposed to abortion, also
hints that there may be some circumstances in which abortion should be
permitted even if the embryo or fetus is a person under the Fourteenth
Amendment. Paulsen argues that if a fetus is a Fourteenth Amendment
person, then "this would defeat the asserted constitutional liberty of a
woman and her doctor to choose to kill it (outside of some extreme
justification of tragic necessity)."'153 Paulsen does not elaborate on the kinds
of "tragic" facts that would justify an abortion. Yet the National Right to
Life Committee has rejected the argument that any abortion could be
justified as "necessary." Its Executive Director, David N. O'Steen, has
declared, "A candidate who argues that legal abortion is 'necessary' is not a
149
CARTER, supra note 117, 252-53.
0
15
Id. at 252 (quoting Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 156-57 (1973)).

'1Id. at 252-53.
152

See Chemerinsky, supra note 17, at 112-13.

153
Paulsen, supra note 114, at 208 (emphasis added).
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pro-life candidate."' 54 As discussed above, if a fetus is a person, virtually no
abortion, even in tragic circumstances such as those involving rape or
incest, qualifies as justifiable homicide.155
Acknowledging that the fetus is not the moral equivalent of a
person does not necessarily entail viewing the embryo or fetus as a morally
insignificant "lump of tissue," as abortion rights opponents frequently
charge. For example, Ronald Dworkin, in Life's Dominion, argues that
developing human life is sacred even before it attains the status of
personhood.1 56 Whether or not one finds this characterization of embryonic
or fetal life convincing, there is room for a wide range of views about the
moral value of a fetus. The importance of denying personhood, however, is
that there is no longer an automatic, morally ironclad reason to deny a
woman a right to abortion. If an embryo or fetus is a person, abortion is
murder and must be banned.157 If it is something morally significant, but
5

short of a person, the answer is much less certain.' 8
Instead, one must now argue why the state's interest in something
that is not a person must override a woman's own moral agency in the
abortion decision. More specifically, abortion rights opponents must explain
why abortion should be allowed in some contexts (for example, where the
life of the woman is at stake) and not in others (for example, where the
physical health, but not the life, of the woman is at risk, assuming these two
circumstances can be neatly distinguished by a medical professional). Once
fetal personhood is no longer the centerpiece of the moral discourse about
abortion, a very different discussion can begin. This discussion gives more
room for the complex moral dimensions of a woman's decision to enter the
debate, in contrast to the liberal "bracketing" approach, which tends to
avoid these issues. 59

154 Steven Ertlet, John McCain Says He Didn't Flip-Flop on Wanting Abortion

Case Reversed, LIFENEWS.COM, Feb. 20. 2007, http://www.lifenews.com/nat294l.html.
155 See supra Part I.B.
156 DWORKIN,

supra note 10, at 68-70, 108-110.

157 See supra Part I.B.
158 DWORKIN,

supra note 10, at 12-13 (arguing that an abortion opponent who

concedes the fetus is not a person may still oppose abortion, but the discussion will be
fundamentally different); see infra Part 111.

1" See infra Part III.
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B. Conservatives 'Misleading Rhetoric of 'Life "and 'Motherhood"
The term "life," and its variants "human life" or "human being," are
slippery terms, and conservatives have skillfully exploited their ambiguities
to suggest that the embryo or fetus is a person without committing fully to
this view. Justice Kennedy used this kind of rhetoric to bolster his ruling
upholding the federal abortion ban in Carhart 11.160 In a particularly
controversial part of the opinion, Justice Kennedy wrote:
Respect for human life finds an ultimate expression in the bond
of love the mother has for her child. . . . Whether to have an
abortion requires a difficult and painful moral decision ....
[I]t
seems unexceptionable to conclude some women come to regret
their choice to abort the infant life they once created and
sustained .... It is self-evident that a mother who comes to regret
her choice to abort must struggle with grief more anguished and
sorrow more profound when she learns . . . that she allowed a
doctor to pierce the skull and vacuum the fast-developing
brain of
16 1
her unborn child, a child assuming the human form.
The Court upheld the federal ban in part because it claimed that the
Act prohibited a single procedure and could be safely circumvented by
doctors providing abortions after the first trimester of pregnancy. 162 Thus,
Justice Kennedy clearly did not intend to say that a woman was committing
murder in having an abortion. In fact, he seemed to suggest that an
embryo's moral status grows as it develops physically. But the words
"infant life," "human life," "child," and "unborn child" call to mind not
embryos or fetuses but babies. Kennedy's persistent references to the
pregnant woman as a "mother" reinforce this perception. By invoking terms
that suggest that abortion is murder, Kennedy appealed to a moral position
that his own decision undermined: according to Kennedy, the Court's
decision to uphold the ban would only steer physicians63 to other methods
and would not prevent a single abortion from occurring.
Like Justice Kennedy, President Bush discussed the federal ban in
terms that evoked fetal personhood. In signing the ban, Bush asserted that
160Gonzales

v. Carhart (CarhartI), 550 U.S. 124, 158-59 (2007).

161Id
62

1

Id. at 150, 164-66.

163See

id. at 186-87 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
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"the most basic duty of government is to defend the life of the innocent.
Every person, however frail or vulnerable, has aplace and apurpose in this
world.', 164 His language was jarringly misplaced given the legislation's
stated purpose and instead seemed more appropriately directed at a total ban
on abortions.
President Bush's use of the phrase "innocent human life" to
describe embryos in other contexts has confused his own staff. Michael
Sandel recounts an incident in which, upon vetoing a bill to fund embryonic
stem cell research in 2006, President Bush said that the federal government
should not sanction "the taking of innocent human life., 165 Tony Snow, the
President's press secretary at the time, publicly interpreted this statement to
mean that President Bush regarded destroying embryos as "murder." But
the White House observed the public's negative response and later asserted
that Snow had "overstated" the President's position. Sandel asks how it is
that Snow could have overstated the case if an embryo is a person. 166 This
highlights the difficulties posed by ambiguous language about "human life."
To most listeners, the language means "person," but67 when pressed the
speaker may disavow intending to invoke personhood.1
President Bush's use of the adjective "innocent" only adds to the
confusion. Although "innocent" may mean "harmless," its more common
meaning (and the68 one seemingly relevant here) is "free from sin or guilt" or
"morally pure."' "Innocence" in this sense is an attribute of personhood,
since only persons are capable of being morally wrong.' 69 Bush's use of the
164Press Release, The White House, President Bush Signs Partial Birth Abortion
Ban Act of 2003 (Nov. 5, 2003).
165SANDEL, ETHICS
166 See

& GENETIC ENGINEERING,

supra note

85, at 103.

id.

167 On rare occasions, a politician will more clearly indicate that she means
"person" when referring to "human life." Senator Sam Brownback, for example, has said,
"[A] human embryo ... is a human being just like you and me; and it deserves the same
respect that our laws give to us all." Michael J. Sandel, Op-Ed, Embryo Ethics, BOSTON
GLOBE, Apr. 8, 2007, at El (quoting Senator Sam Brownback, Republican of Kansas)
(internal quotation marks omitted) (emphasis added).
68

1 THE NEW SHORTER OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY
169 In

1373 (1993).

fact, George Lakoff claims that, while conservatives view fetuses as "the

most innocent people of all," GEORGE LAKOFF, MORAL POLITICS: WHAT CONSERVATIVES
KNOW THAT LIBERALS DON'T 169 (2003), they believe that all humans are born immoral, and
it is the job of parents (especially fathers) to set standards of behavior and punish
transgressions. Id. at 76.
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term thus reinforces the impression that by "innocent human life" he means
a person. But the use of "innocence" to describe the fetus is incongruous
with the positions of many conservative politicians like Bush, who call for
rape or incest exceptions to any ban on abortion. If embryos are "innocent,"
those that are the product of rape or incest are no less so. By insisting upon
exceptions for rape or incest, conservatives instead seem more interested in
the woman's perceived innocence (or guilt). A woman who is the victim of
rape or incest is "innocent," in contrast with a woman who engages in
consensual sex and who is considered morally culpable. 170 In oral
arguments in Roe v. Wade, Justice White openly identified pregnant women
as morally guilty. He asked counsel for Texas, Robert Flowers, "Well, if
you're correct that the fetus is a person, then ... the State would have great
trouble permitting an abortion, would it?' 7 1 Flowers answered that it
would, unless the woman's life was at stake, in which case "there would be
the balancing of the two lives."' 172 Justice White rejoined, "Well, what
73
would you choose? Would you choose to kill the innocent one, or what?"'
The impression that conservatives view most women who seek
abortions as guilty and worthy of punishment is reinforced by a
comprehensive study of the abortion and child welfare policies in the fifty
states.174 One would expect that if abortion restrictions were really
motivated by a belief in fetal or embryonic personhood, state laws
restricting abortion would generally be accompanied by other childprotective laws. The study, however, showed the reverse. The states with
the most restrictive abortion laws also spent the least to educate children,
facilitate adoption, and provide assistance to poor children. 7 5 The study's
author found that this apparent contradiction was largely explained by

170

see also

See

TRIBE,

DWORKIN,

supra note 66, at 132; Borgmann & Weiss, supra note 109, at 42;

supra note 10, at 96-97 (discussing this and other possible bases for

conservative support of abortion in cases of rape).
171

Transcript of Oral Reargument, Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (No. 70-

18), http://www.oyez.org/cases/1970-1979/1971/1971
172

70_18/reargument/.

Id.

173
Id.Flowers acknowledged that, by including a life exception, "in our statute the

State did choose that way... [for t]he protection of the mother." Id.
174JEAN REITH SCHROEDEL, Is THE FETUS A PERSON?:
ACROSS THE FIFTY STATES

171Id. at

18-20 (2000).

153, 157.
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hostility to women. 76 The more hostile statewide public opinion was
was relative to
toward women's equality, and the lower women's income
177
men's, the more likely a state was to restrict abortion.
These inconsistencies in conservatives' position on embryonic
personhood have remained largely unexamined in the public debate.
Politicians who dare to expose the logical consequence of treating an
embryo or fetus as a person have faced vitriol from conservative
commentators. Robert Novak chastised 2008 Republican presidential
candidate Fred Thompson when Thompson rejected the Republican Party's
abortion plank on the grounds that he opposed punishing women for
abortions. Novak fumed:
Fred Thompson was well into a prolonged dialogue about
abortion on NBC's "Meet the Press" on Sunday when he said
something that stunned social conservatives: "I do not think it is a
wise thing to criminalize young girls and perhaps their parents as
aiders and abettors." He then went further: "You can't have a
girls ...and say,
[federal] law" that "would take young, young
178
basically, we're going to put them in jail."'
Knowing that the Republican platform endorses a complete ban on
abortions, one might at first believe Novak was outraged at Thompson's
unwillingness to criminalize women's own conduct in seeking abortions.
But Novak continued:
Those comments sent e-mails flying across the country, reflecting
astonishment and rage from pro-life Republicans who had turned
to Thompson as their best presidential bet for 2008. No serious
antiabortion legislation ever has included criminal penalties
against women who have abortions, much less their parents.
Jailing women is a spurious issue raised by abortion rights

activists. Interviewer Tim Russert did not bring it up in his
questioning. What Thompson said could be expected from
NARAL Pro-Choice America.
Thompson's comments revealed an astounding lack of sensitivity
about abortion.... Whether the candidate just blurted out his
76

1

Id. at 161-62.

171Id. at
178

A27.

159-62, 164.

Robert D. Novak, A Major Abortion Blunder, WASH. POST, Nov. 8, 2007, at
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statement or had planned it, it suggested a failure to realize how
much his chances 1for
the Republican nomination depend on
79
social conservatives.
Novak repeatedly berated Thompson in the column for his failure to
support, as the Republican Party's plank does, "a 'human life' constitutional
amendment banning all abortions."'' 8 0 But it was not clear what angered
Novak more: that Thompson declined to endorse the amendment, or that
Thompson had flagged the inconsistency in Republican support for a total
ban (on the grounds that abortion is tantamount to murder) while refusing to
criminalize the woman's conduct. Novak referred derisively to the issue of
punishing women as "the criminalization chimera, ' 81 an issue, he claimed,
that interests only pro-choice advocates and politicians. Yet if a fetus is a
person, then why should the woman be exempt from punishment? Novak
offered no explanation.
The apparent accepted wisdom (fervently endorsed by Novak) that
Thompson should have sidestepped the issue of punishing women for
abortion reveals conservatives' discomfort in squarely addressing the
proposition that an embryo is a person. When Novak referred to
82
Thompson's "astounding lack of sensitivity" regarding the abortion issue,'
he did not appear to mean that Thompson failed to appreciate the embryo's
personhood (and thus the moral gravity of abortion). Rather, Thompson
failed to appreciate the landmine that the issue presents for conservatives.
That is, by piercing through the ambiguous terminology of "life" and
challenging conservatives to live up to their rhetoric, Thompson was
insensitive to the awkward position in which he placed social conservatives.
Novak knew that conservatives cannot reconcile their support
for an
83
exempt.'
be
conduct
women's
that
demand
their
with
ban
abortion
While it is perhaps not surprising that politicians and pundits should
employ vague and misleading verbal tactics in arguing against abortion
rights, scholars opposed to abortion rights have also traded on the rhetoric
179

Id. (emphases added).

180 Id.
182 Id.

182 id.
183 Novak's reaction is consistent with George Lakoff's observation that
conservatives use "Orwellian language-language that means the opposite of what it says"when their positions are vulnerable and "they cannot just come out and say what they mean."
LAKOFF,

supra note 35, at 22.
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of "life." Michael Stokes Paulsen's dissenting opinion in Jack Balkin's
book, What Roe v. Wade Should Have Said, is replete with ambiguous, yet
emotionally laden, rhetoric that gestures at embryonic personhood. For
example, Paulsen writes:
Recognition of the humanity of the fetus would appear sufficient
to trump the claimed right to abortion in all but the most limited
circumstances of true medical necessity. . . . [I]f the human
embryo or human fetus is a living human being, it becomes
virtually impossible to justify a constitutional right of certain
individuals to kill that human being whenever they so choose....
The essential question ... is whether the fetus is a living human
being.184
Similarly, he writes, "[T]he question on which every other aspect of
any legal analysis necessarily depends-is whether the unborn human fetus
or embryo is a member of the human family, to whom the state may, or
perhaps must, provide basic protection of the laws, including protection of
his or her right to life.... ,,5
Paulsen never clarifies whether by "human life" he means "person."
He does not seem consistently to view an embryo as a person, since he
appears unsure whether a state "may or must" protect fetuses as fully as it
protects persons. 186 He claims it is not necessary to equate "human life"
with "person" in order to for the state's interest in the fetus to trump any
right held by the woman. 8 7 However, Paulsen does not justify why abortion
must be prohibited if "human life" does not mean "person." If an embryo or
fetus is not a person, then abortion is not as extreme as murder. The embryo
may have moral significance, but the state allows people to make decisions
about countless morally weighty issues, even where the lives of persons

184

Paulsen, supra note 114, at 207 (emphasis added).

185

id.

186 In an earlier article, Paulsen seems more clearly to identify embryos as persons,
calling abortion a moral evil equivalent to the Holocaust and "at least as" significant as
slavery. See Michael Stokes Paulsen, Accusing Justice: Some Variations on the Themes of

Robert M Cover's Justice Accused, 7 J.L. & RELIGION 33, 49, 76-77 (1989). But, even in
this article, he does not clearly condemn potential "justifications" for abortion, including
"rape, incest, health of the mother, [and] emotional distress," that are inconsistent with
viewing an embryo or fetus as a person. Id. at 48; see also supra Part I.B.
87

'

Id. at 210-11.
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hang in the balance.' 88 Paulsen could argue that the law does sometimes
prohibit immoral conduct, such as animal abuse, not directed at persons.
But, in the abortion context, there is a heavy countervailing weightnamely the woman's interest in liberty and bodily integrity-that Paulsen
does not account for.
As becomes clear when one attempts to grapple with Paulsen's
argument, it is virtually impossible to engage in a coherent discussion with
someone relying upon ambiguous terms like "life" without first clarifying
what these terms mean. If one simply concedes that an embryo or fetus is a
"living human being," Paulsen appears to think he has won the argument,
but his terminology begs the question what it means that the person is a
"living human being." The biologicalfact that an embryo or fetus is human
simply does not answer the moral (or legal) question of whether and when
it is to be accorded some or all of the rights of a person.
Because conservative
politicians, political
commentators,
advocates, and scholars alike tend to use terms that evoke personhood in a
confusing and often deceptive way, the discourse deserves careful
examination. "Life" as employed by abortion rights opponents is a "thin"
use of the word. To the extent it is rooted in fact, it refers to the fact that a
blastocyst, or embryo, or fetus, is a human organism that is in the process of
developing into a full person. Because abortion opponents want their view
to be accepted as not necessarily tied to religious doctrine, they typically do
not elaborate on the religious significance of this life, for example, that at a
certain point it is ensouled 1 89 Their claim that the fetus is a "life" is thus a
minimal assertion that does nothing to clarify the debate over abortion.
There is no moral agency involved, nor even any awareness, at most stages
of fetal development. Even doctors who provide abortions would not deny
that a growing fetus is "living."' 90 And all would agree that the living fetus
is of the human species.' 91
' See infra Part III.

189See, e.g.,SCHROEDEL, supra note 174, at 18-20 (summarizing historical,

philosophical, and theological theories about moral status of the fetus, including the concept
of ensoulment).
190 See, e.g., R.I. Med. Soc'y v. Whitehouse, 66 F. Supp. 2d 288, 295 (D.R.I.

1999), aff'd, 239 F.3d 104 (1st Cir. 2001); Planned Parenthood, Inc. v. Miller, 30 F. Supp. 2d
1157, 1165 (D. Iowa 1998), aff'd, 195 F.3d 386 (8th Cir. 1999); Eubanks v. Stengel, 28 F.
Supp. 2d 1024, 1033 (W.D. Ky. 1998), aff'd, 224 F.3d 576 (6th Cir. 2000).
191As Paulsen points out, since "a human embryo . . . is clearly life, and it is
clearly human life," the term "potential life" is nonsensical when used to describe a living
human fetus. Paulsen, supra note 114, at 207.
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This use of "life" stands in stark contrast to the life of a woman
seeking an abortion, a woman whose own life is almost wholly disregarded
in conservative rhetoric against abortion. Conservatives tend to ignore the
"thick" conception of life that captures each particular pregnant woman's
life in all its multi-layered complexity.
Those who oppose abortion often use a process of visualization to
stir people's emotions. Yet what they ask us to visualize is an
isolated picture of a fetus. Where is the person who develops,
nurtures, and sustains the fetus we are looking at? Where is the
woman? In this vision, she is insignificant, devalued. When a
woman does somehow momentarily enter our view, she is
rendered translucent, a ghost of a real person.192
A pregnant woman is situated in a time and place that is shaped by
the narrative of her life and that is infused with moral obligations and
aspirations, relationships, practical commitments, and religious and moral
beliefs. She has experienced pleasure and pain, joy and sorrow, triumph and
defeat. Along the way, events out of her control have shaped her life, but
she has also helped to shape it. She may be a college student who is
determined to pursue a particular career before or instead of becoming a
mother. She may be a teenage victim of forcible incest who nonetheless
managed to find her way to an abortion clinic. She may already be a mother
of several children who knows that she cannot continue to provide a good
life for her family if she bears another child. The conservative rhetoric
wholly193ignores-or, worse, trades upon-these deeper aspects of the term
"life."
When conservatives concede the permissibility of a "life exception"
for the woman in abortion regulations, they again ignore the complexity of
real women's lives. What does it mean to save a woman's "life," in the
context of an untenable pregnancy? In the nineteenth century, nearly all
abortion prohibitions included a "therapeutic exception" allowing abortion
when a physician determined it was necessary to preserve a woman's life.
Most laws gave doctors unlimited discretion in deciding whether the
exception was met. As Kristin Luker explains, no laws defined precisely
when a woman's "life" was at stake: "For example, must the threat be
192TRIBE,

supra note 66, at 136.

193See GEORGE LAKOFF & MARK JOHNSON, METAPHORS WE LIVE BY 163, 236-37

(1980) (explaining that the ways we categorize things highlight certain properties while
downplaying or hiding others, and asserting that in politics these categories "matter more,
because they constrain our lives").

ColumbiaJournalof Gender and Law

594

[Vol. 18:2

immediate or can it be long term? Similarly, they did not specify the
confidence level needed. Must the pregnancy be an ' unquestionable
threat to
94
maternal life, or could the threat be only probable?"'
Luker suggests that the ambiguity in the term "life" was deliberate.
Life could mean "physical life in the narrow sense of the word (life or
death)," or it could mean "the social, emotional, and intellectual life of a
woman in the broad sense (style of life)."' 95 "Thus," Luker explains,
"'saving the life' of the mother may mean saving her only from imminent
96
death, or it may mean protecting the process and quality of her daily life."'
Luker claims that even anti-abortion-rights physicians performed abortions
for both of these reasons, 97 and that many such physicians-as evidenced
by articles on abortion in the Index Medicus-in the period 1900-1960
performed abortions under "life" exceptions for reasons including rape,
maternal health or fetal indications, and even economic or "social"
reasons. 198 This suggests both that nineteenth-century anti-abortion-rights
physicians had a broader conception of "life" as it pertains to the woman
than social conservatives do today, and that they "never believed that
embryos had an absolute right to life."' 199
However, the contemporary conservative view of what it means to
include a "life exception" for the woman has clearly narrowed. It no longer
encompasses the kinds of social circumstances Luker describes. It does not
include whether a pregnancy was caused by rape or incest. Nor does it
include physical health risks to the woman that are short of lifeendangering. Conservatives' diminished view of what a "life" exception
means is evidenced by their adamant opposition to health exceptions in
194LUKER,

supra note 129, at 33.

195Id. at 34. See also Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 192 (1973) (finding that

doctor's medical judgment that abortion is "necessary" "may be exercised in the light of all
factors-physical, emotional, psychological, familial, and the woman's age-relevant to the
well-being of the patient") (internal quotation marks omitted).
196 LUKER, supra note 129,

at 33.

117Id. at 33-34.

19'
Id. at 46-47.
'99Id. at 33-35. Thus, Luker claims, while these physicians were making the
"unprecedented claim" of an absolute right to life for an embryo or fetus, in practice they
treated the embryo's right to life as conditional. The core of their movement was really about
assigning to doctors the "social responsibility for assessing the conditional rights of the
embryo against the woman's right to life." Id.at 35.
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abortion legislation.2 °° In South Dakota, for example, a debate has raged
over whether an abortion ban must include not only a life exception but one
for rape, incest, and the woman's health.2 °1
Conservatives' use of the term "mother" is as thin as their
references to "life." To the extent conservatives do look at the woman's life,
they see her only as either embracing or rejecting motherhood.20 2 They view
it as women's natural calling to be mothers. 20 3 An anti-abortion-rights
strategy memo proclaims that "abortion destroys the most important liberty
interests women have in life., 20 4 Of course, for women who do not feel a
maternal impulse to the embryo or fetus or who have no desire to be
mothers, now or ever, this label is falsely applied. Even for women to
whom the concept of motherhood is applicable in some way, the
conservative conception of "motherhood" is an impoverished one, for it
looks only at the narrow snapshot of a pregnant woman and her fetus up to
the point of birth. Abortion is portrayed as posing a binary set of choices:
either the woman ends the pregnancy and rejects motherhood or she carries
to term and embraces it.
Justice Kennedy, for example, suggested in Carhart II that the
question for all women facing unintended pregnancy is whether to heed the
ultimate calling to be mothers or whether to do violence to that calling (at

200 See Jim Kuhnhenn, Obama: Mental Distress Can't Justify Late Abortion,

ASSOCIATED PRESS,

July 3,

2008, available at http://www.huffingtonpost.com/huff-

wires/20080703/obama-abortion/ (stating that health exceptions are "considered a legal
loophole by abortion opponents").

201 When the South Dakota legislature enacted an abortion ban in 2006 that lacked
these exceptions, the public rejected the ban as too extreme. See Davey, supra note 48. In
November 2008, voters rejected a newly drafted ban that included these exceptions. See
Sharpies, supra note 48; see also infra Part III (discussing South Dakota voter ambivalence
over narrowly defining circumstances under which abortions should be permitted).
202 In support of an ultimate goal to ban all abortions, an anti-abortion-rights

strategy memo declared, "We must now debate ...the destruction of the rights, interests and
health of the children's mothers." Casey & Cassidy, supra note 23, at 14.
203 See, e.g., Siegel, New Politics, supra note 35, at 992, 999-1000 (describing the

sex stereotypes that underlie abortion regulations, such as the belief that restrictions protect
"the mother's fundamental natural intrinsic fight to a relationship with her child"); see also
Gonzales v. Carhart (Carhart 11),
550 U.S. 124, 184-85 (2007) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting)
("This way of thinking reflects ancient notions about women's place in the family and under
the Constitution ...that have long since been discredited.").
204 Casey & Cassidy, supra note 23, at 10.
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great risk to their mental stability).2 °5 However, far from giving regard to a
pregnant woman's life, such a romantic, idealized characterization of
pregnant women as mothers snatches away the full picture of each
particular woman's life and replaces it with an artificial and onedimensional construct. The real complexities of motherhood are obviously
not captured by this binary approach. It ignores the lifelong, irrevocable
effect that motherhood has on a woman's future. It ignores the fact that the
woman may already be a mother to existing children. It ignores the young
woman who plans to be a mother in the future and knows that she must
complete her education and grow more mature before she can be the kind of
mother she aspires to be. It ignores the woman who cannot bear the thought
of carrying and giving birth to her own child if she is unable to parent it.
Just how thin the conservative concept of motherhood is becomes
apparent when one remembers that-if a pregnant woman or girl
determines she is not fit or prepared to be a mother-conservatives blithely
suggest that she should give birth anyway and give up her baby for
adoption.2 °6 What happens to the "bond of love" a woman supposedly has
to the "infant life she once created and sustained"20 7 when she must
relinquish her child? Why does it not seem "unexceptionable to conclude
[that] some women come to regret their choice" to bear a child they cannot
raise? 20 8 Indeed, conservatives'
disingenuous, thin invocation of
205See Carhart11, 550

U.S.

at 158-59.

206 See Siegel, The Right's Reasons, supra note 51, at 1678-79 & n.122; see also

Katherine C. Sheehan, Toward a Jurisprudenceof Doubt, 7 UCLA WOMEN'S L.J. 201, 209
(1997).

CarhartII, 550 U.S. at 159 (discussing pregnant woman's "bond of love" with
her embryo and her assumed regret over choosing abortion).
207

208Id.; see DWORKIN, supra note 10, at 103-04. The Girls Who Went Away, a book
which presents the oral histories of dozens of women who surrendered their babies for
adoption at a time when abortion was illegal, poignantly conveys the anguish, guilt, and
emotional loss these mothers experienced. See generally ANN FESSLER, THE GIRLS WHO
WENT AWAY:

THE HIDDEN

HISTORY OF WOMEN

WHO SURRENDERED

CHILDREN FOR

ADOPTION INTHE DECADES BEFORE ROE V. WADE (2006); and Sheehan, supra note 206, who

notes:
A woman who gives up her baby for adoption is nonetheless a mother of
that child .... To give her baby up, a mother must either prevent herself
from coming to know the person she is so intimately creating, or
establish and then attempt to sever the bond between them .... Adoption
can appear to be a solution to the problem of coerced motherhood only
by trivializing the impact of involuntary pregnancy on the physical
integrity and psychological well-being of the mother.
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motherhood sets women up for a lifetime of guilt when, having surrendered
their babies for adoption, they later realize they have violated our culture's
entrenched "ideal form of motherhood in which maternal presence has
become the essence of good mothering." 20 9 These women must face a fierce
cultural condemnation of maternal separation, which is seen as justified
only by the most desperate circumstances:
The notion of separation as maternal sacrifice and as a decision of
last resort remains vigorous today. Mothers who fail to separate
when conditions call for it-or, the more common occurrence in
present times, mothers who separate when conditions do not-are
regarded as misguided, selfish, unnatural. . . .Separating from
one's child-even temporarily, even for sensible reasons-is now
often viewed as the worst thing a mother can do. It is often taken
as proof that she is not a good mother at all and should not be
allowed to resume the status she has abandoned. Thus mothers
who voluntarily place children in foster care often find it difficult
to retrieve them and mothers who put children in day care while
they work or study may lose custody of them in a subsequent
2 10
divorce.
"So," one might respond to all this, "there are thick and thin
conceptions of the terms 'life' and 'motherhood.' Why is it so objectionable
for conservatives to use the thin conceptions of these terms?" The answer is
that conservatives exploit the widely held thick conceptions of these terms
in order to claim the moral high ground and gain sympathy in the abortion
debate, even as they can only commit to the thin versions. They thus
employ a kind of bait and switch: they know that when they invoke the
words "life" and "mother," they instinctively conjure up for people the
richer conceptions of these terms. To promote life in its thick sense carries a
moral urgency and legitimacy. To be for motherhood in its thick sense is

Id. at 209 n.20.
209 Carol Sanger, Separatingfrom Children,96 COLUM. L. REv. 375, 378 (1996).

Id. at 377 (internal citations omitted); see also Sheehan, supra note 206, at 209
n.20 ("[T]he same social conditioning that produces unwanted pregnancy stigmatizes women
who give up their children[.]") (citing ELIZABETH BARTHOLET, FAMILY BONDS: ADOPTION
AND THE POLITICS OF PARENTING (1993)). Social condemnation of maternal separation is not
consistently applied across race and class lines, however. As Sanger points out, far from
being reviled for decisions to separate from their children, poor women are often expected to
do so. Sanger, supra note 209, at 385.
210

Columbia Journalof Gender and Law

[Vol. 18:2

morally praiseworthy. When conservatives
misleadingly use the term "life"
211
in this way, they betray our trust.
Two ads run by conservative and liberal groups respectively on the
abortion issue are revealing in how they employ the term "life." The
conservative ads were commissioned by the DeMoss Foundation in the
early 1990s and bore the tag line, "Life. What a Beautiful Choice., 21 2 As
one reporter described them:
The commercial
spots
themselves
were
deliberately
uncontroversial, going for gorgeous Reagan-era images of happy
kids and unharried parents rather than the more familiar antichoice portrait of gored nine-month "fetuses." They associated
joy, family and fulfillment with the antiabortion position. The
word "abortion" was never uttered; the American "value" of life
213
was.
The videos thus traded on a thick conception of life, rooted in
human interactions and loving relationships, and avoided the more accurate
thin conception of life the conservative position implicates, namely that of
an embryo or fetus growing within the uterus. It did not escape liberals that
the ads were trading insincerely on thick conceptions of "life." One
advocacy organization tried to reclaim the term with a commercial spot that
invoked similar imagery and spoke of women's autonomy to make
moral
214
choices, closing with the question, "What's life without choice?"
Conservatives would like to have us believe that to forbid abortions
will lead to a greater appreciation of babies, children, and family
relationships. But their political positions do nothing to further the thick
conceptions of life that they invoke. As Reva Siegel points out, we have
reason to be concerned about many of the "life constraints" that shape not
only women's decisions about abortion but also other important decisions

211 See LAKOFF, supra note 35, at 77 (explaining how disingenuous framing of

political issues amounts to betrayal of public trust).
212 David Van Biema, Who Are Those Guys?, TIME, Aug. 1, 1999, available at
http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,991686,00.html.
213 Jennifer Baumgardner, The Pro-ChoicePR Problem, NATION, Mar. 5, 2001, at

19.

214 Press Release, The Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation, NARAL Launches New
Abortion
Rights
TV
Ad
Campaign
(Jan.
5,
http://www.kaisemetwork.org/dailyreports/repindex.cfm?hint-2&DRID=2054.

2001),
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such as whether to accept a particular job or to get married. But, she
contends:
Blanket restrictions on abortion are not designed to address these
concerns. They violate the dignity of women who are fully
competent to make decisions, and do absolutely nothing to help
women who are subject to coercion or mental confusion, or to
alter the pressures on women who have decided ending a
pregnancy is the best choice under the life circumstances
and
215
institutional arrangements in which they find themselves.
The term "life" is sufficiently vague to lull the public, however, so
that the discrepancies between conservatives' rhetoric and their positions go
largely unnoticed. It allows conservative politicians to court voters on both
sides of the abortion issue. For conservative voters, "life" is a code word;
the presidential candidate who says he wants to promote a "culture of life"
signals to conservative voters that he opposes abortion. 1 6 At the same time,
to promote a "culture of life" sounds appealing even to liberals. Who can be
against promoting a "culture of life," especially if one has in mind the thick
sense of the word? It is only by engaging in a direct dialog over the
meanings of these terms that their misleading nature is revealed and a more
forthright and fruitful debate about abortion can be had.
III. ADVANCING A SERIOUS MORAL CONVERSATION
ABOUT ABORTION
Exposing the insincerities and confusions in the rhetoric of "life"
and "motherhood" in the abortion debate frees up the debate from a vague,
yet often unquestioned, tie to embryonic or fetal personhood. It helps to
clear up what is-and is not-at stake when the state outlaws or regulates
abortion. A conservative who does not in fact consistently view the embryo
or fetus as a rights-holding person must justify why particular exceptions
and not others are permissible, for example. This is not to say that a
conservative might not still strongly believe abortion should be banned.
But, if that conservative also asserts that there should be rape and incest
exceptions, she will have to justify the inclusion of these particular

215

Siegel, Dignity, supra note 35, at 1796.

216

See LAKOFF, supra note 35, at 85.
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exceptions
without a generalized appeal to the need to protect "human
, 217
life.
Perhaps the conservative will claim that pregnancies caused by rape
and incest are particularly traumatic for the woman, and that in such cases
the state's interest in developing human life does not outweigh the woman's
interest in ridding herself of the traumatic pregnancy. 218 This claim must
then be measured against the many other traumatic circumstances in which
women seeking abortions may find themselves. For example, are exceptions
solely for life, rape, and incest fair if they exclude a woman carrying a
much-wanted pregnancy who suddenly discovers that her fetus has a fatal
anomaly, such as Tay-Sachs disease? What if a single mother of two learns
that carrying her pregnancy to term will render her blind? 219 What of a
woman who suffers from schizophrenia or severe depression? The
conservative view of abortion aims to have the law embody a particular
moral view about abortion. But, because the conservative position lies on
one extreme of the spectrum, and because the law must draw clear lines, the
conservative approach cannot take account of the moral complexities of
women's lives and the realities of the public's perception of the fetus's
moral status.22°
217

Judge Michael McConnell, for example, has argued that abortion rights

opponents might support exceptions for rape and other circumstances and that such support
would depend, "in part, on questions of excuse, justification, compassion (most pro-lifers
view the aborted woman as co-victim), degrees of moral culpability (often, in this context,
ambiguous), appropriateness of the criminal sanction, and prudence." McConnell, supra note
35, at 1194.
Such a scenario recently played out in Brazil, where doctors provided an
abortion to a nine-year-old rape victim who was fifteen weeks pregnant with twins. Alexei
Barrionuevo, Amid Abuse in Brazil, Abortion Debate Flares, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 27, 2009, at
Al. The abortion set off a fiery controversy within the Catholic Church. A Brazilian
Archbishop excommunicated the doctors and others involved in the abortion, declaring that
"while rape was bad, abortion was even worse." Id. The Vatican at first appeared to support
the Archbishop's response. Id.A public uproar ensued, and a conference of Brazilian
Bishops later overruled the excommunications. The Vatican also revised its position, with its
top ethics official conceding that the "credibility of our teaching took a blow as it appeared,
in the eyes of many, to be insensitive, incomprehensible and lacking mercy." Id.
218

219 See, e.g., Tysiqc v. Poland, 219 Eur. Ct. H.R. (2007) (A woman sued the Polish
government for damages after being denied a "therapeutic" abortion where she already had
two children, was on public assistance, and where the pregnancy threatened her eyesight and
ultimately left her legally blind. The Court found that the government had violated Article 8
of the European Convention on Human Rights and awarded the woman E25,000 for pain and
suffering and C14,000 in legal fees.).
220

When pressed in the 2000 campaign on the inconsistency between his
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Although conservative voters often profess support for laws
limiting the availability of non-life-saving abortions to cases of rape and
incest, one state's experience casts doubt on the likelihood that voters
would ultimately accept such laws. In 2006, the South Dakota legislature
enacted a ban on abortions that included only a narrowly drawn exception
for women who would die if denied an abortion.221 When this ban was
presented to voters through a ballot initiative, the measure was defeated.
Opinion polls suggested that voters found the ban too extreme because it
lacked exceptions for rape, incest, and the woman's health.222 Such
exceptions were added in a second attempt to pass a ban in 2008,223 but
voters again decisively rejected the measure.224 It seemed that once the
exceptions were codified, voters lost their stomach for the ban altogether.
The South Dakota experience demonstrates the difficulty of settling upon
certain limited situations that merit abortions, defining those contexts with
particularity, and determining the appropriate penalty. The public may seem
comfortable in the abstract with laws that dictate the circumstances under
which women may have abortions, but when it comes to drafting actual
legislative intervention, the endeavor becomes unacceptably difficult and
distasteful. 2 5
The liberal view of abortion, on the other hand, carries its own
difficulties. In contrast with the conservative view, the liberal approach
incest, Senator John McCain seemed to acknowledge the impossible complexity of

adjudicating the individual circumstances that might justify abortion. McCain commented,
"'I can tell you that this is a Talmudic discussion and one that goes on for hours and hours
We have to make decisions in life, and we have to balance one
and hours and hours ....
thing against the other." Mitchell, supra note 139, at A10.
221H.B. 1215, 81st Sess., Leg. Assem. §§ 2 & 4 (S.D. 2006).

222 Nicholas Riccardi, Revamped Abortion Ban May Have a Chance: South Dakota
Measure is a Version of a 2006 One but Has Exceptionsfor Rape and Incest, L.A. TIMES,
Oct. 27, 2008, at A6.
223 Id.

224 Nicholas Riccardi, Initiatives to Curb Abortions Defeated: South Dakota
Measure Aimed at Causing High Court Review of Roe vs. Wade Loses. Gay Marriage Bans
Win, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 5, 2008, at A18.

225 Polling on abortion corroborates that rape and incest exceptions alone do not
sufficiently capture the scenarios in which the public finds abortion justified. In a 2007 poll
by Fox News and Opinion Dynamics, a majority responded that abortion should be legal
when needed to protect a woman's mental health or when the fetus has a "fatal birth defect."
FOX News/Opinion

Dynamics Poll. Oct. 23-24, 2007, http://www.pollingreport.com/

abortion.htm (last visited Oct. 1, 2009).
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tends to treat the moral complexities of the abortion issue as operating in a
sphere wholly separate from the law regulating abortion. Consequently, its
defense of the right is unnecessarily weak. It gives a free pass to
conservatives who speak ringingly of life and motherhood, but whose
positions do not live up to their rhetoric. Moreover, it invites criticisms of
the right to abortion as a right borne of selfishness and moral bankruptcy.
While the conservative position simplifies discussions of abortion into
ultimately untenable, black-and-white platitudes about "life" and
"motherhood," liberals' unwillingness to engage in a discussion of the
moral dimensions of the embryo or fetus strikes many abortion opponents
as dismissive. As Judge Michael McConnell has argued, "Rawls's own
dismissal of the pro-life position as 'unreasonable' and not requiring further
discussion is a sobering example of a secular 'close out'-not different, in
principle, from those who say, 'The Bible says it, I believe it, and that
resolves it.' ' 2 26 Laurence Tribe completely missed this point when he

criticized Roe for "needlessly insult[ing] and alienat[ing] those for whom
the view that the fetus is a person represents a fundamental article of faith
or a bedrock personal commitment." 227 Tribe suggested that the Court
should have declared abortion to be constitutional "even if the fetus is a
person." 228 But Tribe's suggested approach is more insulting (to
conservatives and to liberals) than direct engagement on the question of
fetal personhood. It suggests that abortion rights rest upon a bankrupt moral
view that would allow a woman to kill her own child.
Liberals, like conservatives, need to appeal to public reason on
abortion. This means acknowledging the moral significance of the abortion
decision, rather than professing agnosticism. The view that seems most
consistent with other considered ethical norms is a gradualist view of
human life. 229 At its earliest stages, human life is morally significant, but
not sufficiently so to outweigh other important moral interests. This
explains our wariness over embryonic stem cell research, yet accommodates
the common view that such research is permissible when aimed at
alleviating human suffering and curing disease. It also explains our
226

Michael W. McConnell, Religion and the Search for a Principled Middle

Ground on Abortion, 92 MICH. L. REV. 1893, 1896 (1994) (book review).
227TRIBE,
228 Id. See

supra note 66, at 135.
also supra Part L.B (citing other scholars who argue same point).

229 See generally DWORKIN, supra note 10; Sandel, Moral Argument, supra note
28, at 532; Margaret Olivia Little, Abortion and the Margins of Personhood,39 RUTGERS
L.J. 331, 333 (2008).
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acceptance of the creation of embryos, most of which will never be used, in
order to allow couples to reproduce when it would otherwise not be
possible. And it explains why early miscarriages, while no doubt often
traumatic, are not viewed as the equivalent of losing a child (no funeral is
held, for example). Fetuses late in pregnancy are viewed with far greater
moral regard than embryos, but even in these circumstances the most ardent
abortion opponents believe the woman's life takes precedence.23 °
To view human life as intrinsically valuable does not mean abortion
must be prohibited, however. The question remains how to weigh human
life that has not yet reached the moral status of a person against a woman's
interest in ending an unwanted or untenable pregnancy. Abortion is one of
many morally significant decisions that adults make throughout their lives.
These decisions may implicate the wellbeing, and even the life or death, of
others. Parents leave children out of their wills. Children neglect to care for
aging parents. A sister refuses to donate blood to her brother, although both
share a rare blood type. While some of these decisions may seem selfish
and morally indefensible, we do not presume that the state is in a better
position to make them. We understand that these kinds of moral decisions
are too complex and nuanced for the law to address. We accept that moral
autonomy comes at the cost of occasional moral missteps.
Abortion is no different. Unintended pregnancy poses a nuanced
moral question that the law is simply too crude and clumsy to answer. 23 1 A
woman's interest in ending an unwanted pregnancy weighs heavily on the
other side of the balance. Her interest may well be influenced by moral
concerns that most would agree justify ending her pregnancy, such as
regard for her existing children, the desire to preserve her own health, or the
hope of finishing school in order to escape a life of poverty. Her bodily
integrity is also at stake. Some say that to force unwanted pregnancy upon
any woman, regardless of her circumstances, is a moral harm far worse than
the destruction of an embryo or fetus, while others vigorously disagree.
Abortion is far from unusual in posing these kinds of nuanced
choices. We make similar moral choices in deciding to undergo fertility
treatments, knowing that a multiple pregnancy is likely and puts each fetus
at greater medical risk. We decide to bear more than one child, knowing
230

See supra Part II.A.
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The Canadian experience is illustrative. Canada formerly permitted abortion

only for therapeutic reasons. But the law became so difficult to apply that the criminal ban
was eventually declared unconstitutional. See Joanna N. Erdman, In the Back Alleys of
Health Care: Abortion, Equality, and Community in Canada, 56 EMORY L.J. 1093, 1093
(2007) (citing R. v. Morgentaler, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 30 (Can.)).
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that the planet is already overcrowded. We decide to enlist in the armed
forces, knowing that we may use weapons to kill others. As is often pointed
out, the law does not require a person to be a "good Samaritan," that is, to
sacrifice herself to save others, even if they are closely related to her. The
law does not punish the parent who refuses to donate her kidney to save her
child. 32 Abortion should be discussed and considered in the context of the
broader array of ethical decisions we entrust to individuals.
Conservatives' rhetoric of life and motherhood, on the other hand,
tries to pluck abortion from the messy world of our recurring moral
decisions. It paints abortion as exceptional, a pure and easily answered
moral question. But, the absolute and fervent nature of the rhetoric of "life,"
far from reflecting deep commitments and personal experiences, evidences
its superficiality. Its consequence
has been the contraction of complexity into a narrow all-ornothing conception. If an egg and a sperm have united, there is a
human being; if not, not .

. .

. The simplicity of the issue, the

obvious identities of the opponents, and the sanction of revered
spiritual leaders give the zealot an energizing and feverish
purpose ....But when so compressed, a moral value, no matter
how heated, takes little space in one's life. It fails to inform what
we do daily, and it makes little difference to the233life of a true
believer whether that narrow value prevails or not.
Only a fraction of those who oppose abortion rights will ever
personally confront the issue. The male members of the movement will
never face unintended pregnancy, nor will the female members who have
surpassed their childbearing years. Those who are sexually active but
manage to avoid pregnancy one way or another will never have their own
lives touched by the abortion question.234 As Kate Michelman, former
executive director of NARAL, said about obtaining a pre-Roe abortion, "I
had to go before a panel of four strange men, whose decision was going to
impact on the rest of my life, but who would not have to bear the burden of
raising four children. Everyone else had control except me, and I had to
bear the consequences." 235 Not surprisingly, many ardent abortion
232 See TRIBE, supra note

66, at 130-35; Borgmann & Weiss, supra note 106.

233 ALBERT BORGMANN, REAL AMERICAN ETHICS: TAKING RESPONSIBILITY FOR OUR

COUNTRY 23-24 (2006) (footnote omitted).
234 Id.

235 TRIBE, supra note 66, at 135 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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opponents who do personally confront unplanned pregnancy will see black
and white quickly dissolve into gray and will judge their own circumstances
sufficiently compelling to procure an abortion secretly. 6
It is likely that the law can never sufficiently capture the thick
conceptions of life and motherhood in order to dictate whether a particular
abortion is morally permissible. Even if it could, it is not clear that we
should use the law in this way. 237 While the law may set a floor for
minimally moral conduct, to transform every moral aspiration into a legal
command takes moral decisions out of individuals' hands in a way that
denies them their moral agency. 238 As Tribe says, "to impose virtue on any
person demeans that person's individual worth. 239 If a woman declines an
abortion only because the law tells her to do so, there is nothing to admire
or condemn. We trust men and women to make profoundly moral decisions
every day. Abortion should be no exception.240
To view abortion as a morally weighty decision that women are
empowered to make and that should be constitutionally protected is as
consistent with the modem notion of "privacy," which speaks to individual
autonomy, as it is with an alternative view of abortion rights as grounded in
women's equality. 241 But, rather than continuing to sidestep the moral

236 See, e.g., Janie Har & Steve Mayes, Erikson Relationship Detailed by Woman,
THE OREGONIAN (Portland, OR), June 23, 2008, at Al ("pro-life" Republican congressional
candidate allegedly paid for girlfriend's abortion); see also Joyce Arthur, "The Only Moral

Abortion Is My Abortion": When the Anti-Choice Choose (Sept. 2000),
http://www.prochoiceactionnetwork-canada.org/articles/anti-tales.shtml (citing sources).
237 Rhonheimer, supra note 35, at 143 ("It is insufficient simply to underline the

immoral character of procured abortion ... in order to establish the need for a corresponding
legislative, even penal, rule.").
238 Id. at 138 ("If civil law were to prohibit and even punish an action such as
abortion, it would do so not simply to impede an immoral act with the aim of leading men
through state authority to practice virtue, to become good, and to attain happiness. It does so
merely to protect the life of the one who, through such an act, would be threatened by death
and deprived of his or her right to live.").
239 TRIBE,

supra note 66, at 135.

240 See id. ("There should be no 'woman's exception' to our traditional regard for
individualism and autonomy.").
241 This view holds that women cannot participate equally in society if they are not
viewed as moral agents who can shape their own futures and destinies by deciding whether
and when to become mothers. See generally Reva B. Siegel, Abortion as a Sex Equality
Right: Its Basis in Feminist Theory, in MOTHERS IN LAW: FEMINIST THEORY AND THE LEGAL
REGULATION OF MOTHERHOOD (Martha Albertson Fineman & Isabel Karpin eds., 1995);
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discussion about abortion as though it has nothing to add to the
constitutional discussion, evolving conceptions of the right to abortion
should incorporate a greater attention to and awareness of the moral
dimensions of the right, and should recognize women as moral agents
empowered to endeavor to make the best decision for themselves and their
families.
Contrary to popular perception, abortion providers tend to
understand the moral significance of abortion and the need for sensitivity to
the woman's particular experience as she confronts the abortion decision.
Carole Joffe, a sociologist who has studied abortion practice for many
years, notes that abortion providers
are not "coarsened toward fetal life" and that there exist[]
countless examples of... "respect for fetal life" . . . . [T]he
worldview that prevails in the world of reproductive health
facilities that include abortion is one that is steeped in sensitivity
and nuance. Above all, there is a recognition of the
inappropriateness of a "one size fits all" approach to pregnant
patients. Some pregnancies are desperately wanted, and the
clinician shares in the exhilaration of the patient. Some
pregnancies are not at all wanted, and the clinician accepts that
no one is better• entitled 242
than the woman herself to decide what to
do about this pregnancy.

Joffe recounts an instance in which an abortion provider,
understanding a patient's desire to see her embryo, rinsed off the amniotic
sac containing the embryo and brought it to the patient in a jar.24 3 In another
example, a clinic administrator spoke of "meeting the woman where she is"
by referring to the embryo or fetus with whatever terminology the patient
herself used.244
Of course, even an abortion opponent who concedes that embryos
and fetuses are not rights-holding persons might oppose abortion for other
Erdman, supra note 231; Sylvia A. Law, Rethinking Sex and the Constitution, 132
REv. 955 (1984).
242

U. PA. L.

Carole Joffe & Wayne C. Shields, Editorial, Morality and the Abortion

Provider,

74

CONTRACEPTION

1

(2006),

available

at

http://www.longviewinstitute.org/research/joffe/abortionprovider (responding to an article by
Frances Kissling, founder of Catholics for a Free Choice).
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reasons. Thus, once it is revealed that virtually no one consistently relies
upon embryonic or fetal personhood as grounds for banning abortion, the
question remains whether abortion should be banned for other reasons, or
restricted in some lesser way (and if so, what sorts of restrictions are
permissible). As Ronald Dworkin points out, "[s]omeone who does not
regard a fetus as a person with rights and interests may . . . object to

abortion just as strenuously as someone who insists it is. But he will object
for a different reason and . . . with very different implications for the

political question
of whether and when the state ought to prohibit or permit
, 24 5
abortion.

The problem with abortion restrictions is that they will almost
invariably be both underinclusive and overinclusive relative to their
proponents' goals. Wherever the bright lines of the law are drawn, they will
allow for different moral responses to unintended pregnancy, some good,
some regrettable, within the boundaries of what is permissible. Inevitably,
the laws will prevent some abortions that most would consider morally
permissible or even compelling.2 46 At the same time, the laws will not
ensure morally commendable responses to unwanted pregnancy, much less
247
ensure moral conduct in a host of other, equally weighty circumstances.
The law cannot force an immoral person to be a moral one. "If we have
genuine concern for the lives others lead, we will also accept that no life is a
good one lived against the grain of conviction, that it does not help someone
else's life but spoils it to force values upon him he cannot accept but can
only bow before out of fear or prudence."24 8
The primary aim of this Article, however, is not to resolve
completely the moral question of abortion. It is, rather, to point out that we
will never have a national conversation worthy of the real moral choices
inherent in the abortion decision if we remain mired in an artificial
disagreement over embryonic or fetal personhood. Our current national
debate about abortion is constantly derailed by impulsive, undeveloped, and
confused assertions about protecting "life." Liberal defenses of abortion
allow these assertions to flourish unimpeded, infecting but not informing
the debate.

245DWORKIN, supra note 10, at

246 See

id.at 173-74.

247 Id.

248

Id. at 167-68.
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IV. CONCLUSION
The abortion debate has stagnated. Conservatives and liberals have
each, in different ways, contributed to the impasse. Conservatives have
based their opposition to abortion on an asserted belief that life begins at
conception. But, they have not opened this belief up to reflection and
revision. The confusing and duplicitous nature of their rhetoric suggests a
belief in embryonic and fetal personhood. But such a position is
inconsistent with conservatives' other considered judgments and therefore
fails the test of reason. Meanwhile, liberals have assumed that
conservatives' beliefs cannot be questioned and have therefore failed to
expose the superficiality of conservative claims about "life." Since liberals
refuse to assign any particular moral significance to the embryo or fetus,
their defense of abortion appears morally impoverished and squanders the
opportunity to affirm the importance of women's equal autonomy to make
weighty moral decisions. The way out of the doldrums is for both sides to
seek reflective equilibrium and to appeal to public reason on abortion. Once
the distracting and misleading question of embryonic and fetal personhood
is taken off the table, a more robust and fruitful debate is possible, one that
could actually reveal common ground in this age-old controversy.

